Access to Information Orders
Decision Information
NATURE OF THE APPEAL: This appeal concerns a decision of the Halton Regional Police Services Board (the Police) made pursuant to the provisions of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act ). The requester (now the appellant) submitted the following request to the Police: Please confirm nature and extent of surveillance, if any, concerning me, our premises above, and otherwise during the past 5+ years. In their response, the Police, pursuant to section 8(3) of the Act , refused to confirm or deny the existence of responsive records. The appellant appealed the Police's decision. During the mediation stage of the appeal process the Police stated that if records do exist they would qualify for exemption under sections 8(1) or 8(2) (law enforcement) of the Act ; they cited the possible application of paragraphs (c), (d), (e), (g) and (l) of section 8(1) and paragraph (a) of section 8(2). No further progress was made during mediation. I first sought and received representations from the Police. In addition to making submissions on the application of the above paragraphs, the Police also raised for the first time the application of paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 8(1). The non-confidential portions of the Police's representations were shared with the appellant who was then given an opportunity to make submissions. The appellant chose not to submit representations. DISCUSSION: REFUSAL TO CONFIRM OR DENY EXISTENCE OF RECORDS AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT EXEMPTION Introduction Section 36(1) of the Act provides individuals with a general right of access to their own personal information in the custody or under the control of an institution. However, this right of access under section 36(1) is not absolute; section 38 provides a number of exceptions to this right. In particular, under section 38(a), a head may refuse to disclose to the individual to whom the information relates personal information where, among others, section 8 would apply to the disclosure of that information. The Police rely on section 8(3) of the Act as the basis for its decision to refuse to confirm or deny whether any responsive records exist. Section 8(3) of the Act permits an institution to refuse to confirm or deny the existence of a record to which section 8(1) or (2) applies. In this case, the Police claim that paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (g) and (l) under section 8(1), and paragraph (a) of section 8(2) are applicable to records of the nature requested, should they exist. In Order P-255 Assistant Commissioner Tom Mitchinson made some general comments about the purpose and application of section 14(3) of the Act [section 14(3) is the provincial Act equivalent of section 8(3)]: By including section 14(3) the legislature has acknowledged that, in order to carry out their mandates, certain institutions involved with law enforcement activities must have the ability, in the appropriate circumstances, to be less than totally responsive in answering requests for access to government-held information. However, as the members of the Williams Commission pointed out in Volume II of their report entitled Public Government for Private People, The Report of the Commission on Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy/1980 at page 301, it would be a rare case in which the disclosure of the existence of a file would communicate information to the requester which may frustrate an ongoing investigation or intelligence-gathering activity. In Order P-344, Assistant Commissioner Mitchinson stated the following with respect to the interpretation and application of section 14(3): A requester in a section 14(3) situation is in a very different position than other requesters who have been denied access under the Act. By invoking section 14(3), the institution is denying the requester the right to know whether a record exists, even when one does not. This section provides institutions with a significant discretionary power which I feel should be exercised only in rare cases. In my view, an institution relying on section 14(3) must do more than merely indicate that records of the nature requested, if they exist, would qualify for exemption under sections 14(1) or (2). An institution must provide detailed and convincing evidence that disclosure of the mere existence of the requested records would convey information to the requester which could compromise the effectiveness of a law enforcement activity. I adopt the principles set out in the above-cited decisions of Assistant Commissioner Mitchinson for the purpose of this appeal. In my view, before the Police may be permitted to exercise their discretion to invoke section 8(3), they must provide sufficient evidence to establish that: The records (if they exist) would qualify for exemption under sections 8(1) or (2); and Disclosure of the fact that records exist (or do not exist) would in itself convey information to the appellant that could compromise the effectiveness of a law enforcement activity that may exist or may be reasonably contemplated. Part one: disclosure of the records (if they exist) Under part one of the section 8(3) test, the Police must demonstrate that the records, if they exist, would qualify for exemption under section 8(1), paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (g) and/or (l), and/or under section 8(2)(a). I will begin by considering whether sections 8(1)(a) and/or (g) apply to the records, if they exist. Sections 8(1)(a) and (g) read: A head may refuse to disclose a record if the disclosure could reasonably be expected to (a) interfere with a law enforcement matter (g) interfere with the gathering of or reveal law enforcement intelligence information respecting organizations or persons The Police submit that if an investigation involving the appellant was underway disclosure of surveillance records created as part of that investigation could reasonably be expected to interfere with the investigation. The Police state further that confirming their existence would by its very nature interfere with the gathering of or reveal law enforcement intelligence information. With respect to section 8(1)(g), the Police make reference to a definition of "intelligence" articulated by former Inquiry Officer Asfaw Seife in Order M-202. In that order, Inquiry Officer Seife stated: In my view, for the purposes of section 8(1)(g) of the Act , "intelligence" information may be described as information gathered by a law enforcement agency in a covert manner with respect to ongoing efforts devoted to the detection and prosecution of crime or the prevention of possible violation of law, and is distinct from information which is compiled and identifiable as part of the investigation of a specific occurrence. The Police state that information contained within a Police intelligence file is highly confidential and extremely sensitive. A file of this nature often includes surveillance and the personal information of individuals other than the target individual. In the Police's view, disclosure of the existence of surveillance or confidentia
Decision Content
NATURE OF THE APPEAL:
This appeal concerns a decision of the Halton Regional Police Services Board (the Police) made pursuant to the provisions of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act). The requester (now the appellant) submitted the following request to the Police:
Please confirm nature and extent of surveillance, if any, concerning me, our premises above, and otherwise during the past 5+ years.