Access to Information Orders
Decision Information
The Ministry of the Solicitor General (now the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services) (the Ministry) received a request under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act), from a member of the media, for access to "all video footage recorded by the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) at Ipperwash Provincial Park (Ipperwash) from September 5-7, 1995" and "all photos taken by the OPP at Ipperwash Provincial Park from September 5-7, 1995."
The Ministry identified a number of responsive videotapes and photographs, and denied access to all of them. The appellant appealed.
During the course of processing this appeal, the records were divided into four categories.
After conducting various inquiries under the Act, I issued two interim orders and one reconsideration order that dealt with all records in Categories 1, 2, and 3 (Interim Order PO-2033-I, Reconsideration Order PO-2063-R and Interim Order PO-2056-I).
Category 4, which dealt with videotaped surveillance records purportedly obtained under Parts VI and XV of the Criminal Code of Canada, was addressed in Final Order PO-2092-F. The Ministry had claimed that the Criminal Code prohibited disclosure of these records. I disagreed, and ordered the Ministry to make an access decision concerning them. The Ministry brought an application for judicial review of my decision. The appellant also brought an application for judicial review, seeking the immediate disclosure of the Category 4 records.
Both of these judicial review applications were subsequently abandoned. In the case of the Ministry's application, the reason for abandoning was that there are no warrants to support the Criminal Code arguments. The Ministry also advised the appellant that more responsive Category 2 records had been located.
Decision Content
NATURE OF THE APPEAL:
The Ministry of the Solicitor General (now the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services) (the Ministry) received a request under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act), from a member of the media, for access to “all video footage recorded by the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) at Ipperwash Provincial Park (Ipperwash) from September 5-7, 1995” and “all photos taken by the OPP at Ipperwash Provincial Park from September 5-7, 1995."
The Ministry identified a number of responsive videotapes and photographs, and denied access to all of them. The appellant appealed.
During the course of processing this appeal, the records were divided into four categories.
After conducting various inquiries under the Act, I issued two interim orders and one reconsideration order that dealt with all records in Categories 1, 2, and 3 (Interim Order PO‑2033-I, Reconsideration Order PO-2063-R and Interim Order PO-2056-I).
Category 4, which dealt with videotaped surveillance records purportedly obtained under Parts VI and XV of the Criminal Code of Canada, was addressed in Final Order PO-2092-F. The Ministry had claimed that the Criminal Code prohibited disclosure of these records. I disagreed, and ordered the Ministry to make an access decision concerning them. The Ministry brought an application for judicial review of my decision. The appellant also brought an application for judicial review, seeking the immediate disclosure of the Category 4 records.
Both of these judicial review applications were subsequently abandoned. In the case of the Ministry’s application, the reason for abandoning was that there are no warrants to support the Criminal Code arguments. The Ministry also advised the appellant that more responsive Category 2 records had been located.
I asked for and received a number of affidavits from the Ministry on the following matters:
1. non-compliance with certain provisions of Interim Order PO-2033-I;
2. why I had been provided with inaccurate information throughout my inquiries, particularly the inquiry leading to Final Order PO-2092-F;
3. why additional records were identified at this late stage; and
4. the adequacy of the Ministry’s search for all responsive records.
I also required the Ministry to provide the appellant with proper access decisions regarding the Category 4 records, in compliance with Final Order PO-2092-F, and for the newly identified Category 2 records. The Ministry issued two decisions to the appellant on September 16, 2003.
In these decisions, the Ministry provided access to all records or portions of records in both categories where consents had been obtained from the individuals identified in the photographs or videotapes. Where consents could not be obtained, the Ministry denied access on the basis of the exemption in section 21 of the Act (invasion of privacy). The Ministry also changed its position with respect to portions of one videotape (Maintenance Tape 10), now claiming that it falls outside the scope of the appellant’s request because it depicts activities taking place at Ipperwash after midnight on September 7, 1995.
The appellant appealed the Ministry’s decisions.
In her letter of appeal, the appellant identifies the following grounds of appeal:
1. The public interest override in section 23 of the Act should outweigh the section 21 exemption for all withheld records, as it did with respect to similar records considered in Interim Orders PO-2033-I and PO-2056-I.
2. Any withheld portions of records containing unidentifiable images or voices do not contain “personal information” and do not qualify for exemption under section 21 of the Act.
3. Any withheld portions of records containing images or voices of media representatives or OPP personnel do not contain “personal information” and do not qualify for exemption under section 21 of the Act.
4. The Ministry should be precluded from now claiming that portions of one videotape are not responsive, and in any event these portions are responsive.
5. The Ministry’s search for responsive records is still inadequate.
6. The Ministry is still not in compliance with Interim Order PO-2033-I.
The appellant provides detailed submissions in support of each ground of appeal.
I combined the Ministry’s two decisions into one appeal.
The appeal was streamed directly to the adjudication stage of the appeal process. I sent a Notice of Inquiry to the Ministry, seeking representations on the six issues. I required affidavit evidence from a number of identified individuals with respect to issues 5 and 6.
The Ministry submitted representations on all issues, with the exception of issues 5 and 6. I decided to proceed with issues 1-4, and sent a copy of the Notice of Inquiry along with the Ministry’s representations on these issues to the appellant. The appellant responded with representations.
As far as issues 5 and 6 are concerned, I granted the Ministry an extension of the original due date for providing the required affidavit evidence, but as of the date of this interim order I have received no affidavits on either issue. I will include provisions in this interim order requiring the Ministry to submit the required affidavit evidence on issues 5 and 6.
RECORDS:
The records at issue in this appeal are all Category 4 and all new Category 2 photographs and videotapes that have not been disclosed to the appellant, either in whole or in part. The parties have maintained a running inventory of these records, which has been provided to me, so I see no need to repeat it here.
As a result of discussions between the Ministry and the appellant, a number of records originally withheld by the Ministry have been disclosed on consent of the various individuals depicted in the photographs and videotapes.
DISCUSSION:
RESPONSIVENESS
Among the various Category 4 videotapes is one, referred to by the Ministry as “Maintenance Tape 10”. This record consists of audio and video recordings beginning at approximately 11:04 pm on September 7, 1995 and continuing to approximately 5:10 am on September 8, 1995. The Ministry initially identified this entire record as responsive to the appellant’s request. However, in its September 16, 2003 decision letter, the Ministry changed its position. The Ministry outlines the reasons in its representations as follows:
The scope of the appellant’s request is from September 5th to September 7th, and comprises an enormous number of records. As a result, the Ministry initially and inadvertently included the latter portion of Maintenance Tape 10 as being responsive to this request. However, the latter portion of this videotape continues into the early morning hours of September 8th. To suggest that the continuation of the videotape after midnight is responsive to the request, as the appellant does, is to ignore the reality of the request. The Ministry submits that the appellant should not be entitled to expand the scope of its request due to an oversight of the Ministry, and should follow the same procedures in making access requests that all other requesters must follow.
The appellant disagrees, and submits:
[The Ministry] treated all of Tape 10 of the Maintenance Building series as responsive to the request for the first three years of this proceeding. It provided the entire tape to the Assistant Commissioner in the earlier phase of this inquiry and to counsel for [the appellant] pursuant to Justice Benotto’s access order [in the context of the judicial review application for Final Order PO-2092-F]. It also included the entire tape in the index for its September 3, 2003 decision letters.
Out of the blue, during the September 3, 2003 viewing of the records by the Stoney Point community members chosen to identify the depicted individuals, counsel for [the Ministry] took the position that only the first part of the tape, up to midnight on September 7, 1995, would be shown to them, as the remainder of the tape fell outside the scope of the request.
[The appellant] submits that a three-year delay is too long for [the Ministry] to wait to try to remove part of a record from the scope of this appeal. It is unfair to now require [the appellant] to make a new request and suffer the resulting delay to obtain a record that has been in issue throughout a three-year proceeding.
In any event, the continuation of the videotape after midnight is responsive. It is clearly connected to the events at Ipperwash Provincial Park on September 5-7, 1995, and includes a wiretapped telephone conversation between two individuals who have consented to disclosure …, in which [one named individual] describes what he witnessed during the confrontation with the OPP and the shooting of [a named protestor] on September 6, 1995. This first-person description of what happened on September 6 is of supreme public importance. …
In my view, the Ministry should not be allowed to change its position at this late stage of the appeal. Maintenance Tape 10 was identified as a responsive record at the first stage of this matter, more than three years ago. Its treatment under the Act was addressed through mediation by this office, and by the Ministry during the course of my inquiry leading to Final Order PO‑2092-F. The entire record was also included within the scope of the judicial review application brought by the Ministry following the issuance of that order. In my view, the Ministry had sufficient opportunity to raise issues of responsiveness on a number of occasions over the course of the past three years and should not be permitted to change its position now. In my view, to require the appellant to submit a new request is simply not reasonable in the circumstances.
That being said, I also find that all portions of Maintenance Tape 10, including those that depict activities taking place after midnight on September 7, 1995, are responsive to the request.
Previous orders have established that in order to be responsive, a record must be "reasonably related" to the request:
In my view, the need for an institution to determine which documents are relevant to a request is a fundamental first step in responding to a request. It is an integral part of any decision by a head. The request itself sets out the boundaries of relevancy and circumscribes the records which will ultimately be identified as being responsive to the request. I am of the view that, in the context of freedom of information legislation, "relevancy" must mean "responsiveness". That is, by asking whether information is "relevant" to a request, one is really asking whether it is "responsive" to a request. While it is admittedly difficult to provide a precise definition of "relevancy" or "responsiveness", I believe that the term describes anything that is reasonably related to the request.
(Order P-880, P-1051)
Maintenance Tape 10 is a single record. It begins at approximately 11:04 pm on September 7 and continues uninterrupted until approximately 5:10 am on September 8. The activities captured by the record are the same - audio and video depictions of activities taking place in the maintenance shed at Ipperwash in the viewing range of a stationary camera installed in that building, and recordings of telephone conversations on a phone installed in the viewing area. One portion of the tape, from approximately 1:16 am to 1:57 am, consists of a video recording of an occupier talking on the telephone, together with an audio recording of his conversation with an individual outside the park. The subject matter of this conversation deals, in part, with activities taking place at Ipperwash during September of 1995, including specific events that transpired during the time period of the appellant’s request. As such, I find that, regardless of the fact that the Maintenance Tape 10 includes recordings of the first approximately five hours of September 8, its entire content is reasonably related to the subject matter and time period of the appellant’s request, and is therefore responsive.
PERSONAL INFORMATION
The section 21(1) personal privacy exemption applies only to information that qualifies as “personal information” under section 2(1) of the Act. “Personal information” is defined as recorded information about an identifiable individual.
Occupiers
In Interim Order PO-2033-I, I found that the depiction of occupiers in Ipperwash contained in Category 2 photographs and videotapes constituted their “personal information” under section 2(1) of the Act. After considering the representations of both parties in this inquiry, I have reached the same conclusion for the same reasons. The Ministry and the appellant both acknowledge in their representations that images of identifiable occupiers depicted on videotapes or photographs constitute their “personal information”. I also find that voice recordings of identifiable occupiers on the audio portion of the various videotapes constitute the “personal information” of these individuals. As noted earlier, the Ministry has disclosed any records depicting occupiers who have provided their consent.
“Unidentifiable” individuals
The appellant takes the position that some individuals who appear in various photographs and videotapes cannot be identified “due to lack of light, obscuring objects such as trees or blurring of the photographic or video image”, and that these portions of records do not contain “personal information”.
The Ministry disagrees, taking the position that because these individuals are “still potentially identifiable” the records “may contain their personal information”. In support of this position, the Ministry submits that:
- although not identifiable by anyone who has yet viewed the records, the individuals could be identified by the public at large if the records are disclosed;
- the records could be “enhanced” such that individuals currently not identifiable could in fact become identifiable;
Having reviewed the various records, I find that some contain images that are unmistakably of occupiers, but there is no “reasonable expectation” that they can be identified due to the quality of the photograph or videotape and/or the fact that they are blocked from view either by lack of light or interference with other objects (Ontario (Attorney General) v. Pascoe, [2002] O.J. 4300 at para.2 (C.A.)). Even if these records do contain “personal information”, my finding under section 23 below would apply to any such information, and for that reason it is not necessary for me to identify the particular photographs and videotapes containing unidentifiable images of occupiers.
Media representatives
The Ministry acknowledges that some of the records depict images of individuals who would appear to represent media outlets, but takes the position that because “we have no factual confirmation that all of the persons in the relevant photographs and videotapes are of media representatives”, these individuals must be notified under section 50(3) of the Act and given “the opportunity to make separate representations, regardless of whether the information about them is determined to be their personal information or not”. The Ministry points to the decision in Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fineberg, [1996] O.J No. 67 (Div Ct.) in support of this position.
The appellant disagrees, and submits:
The Ministry has … provided no reason to doubt that the individuals whom they believe to be media representatives are in fact members of the media … . It is reasonable to infer from the circumstances of the footage that the individuals whose depictions are at issue are media representatives. Individuals who are interviewing other people or giving news reports while holding a microphone with the name of a media organization on it, or who are holding a camera with the logo of a media organization, can reasonable be treated as media representatives. It is not necessary to have “factual confirmation” as the Ministry alleges; it is sufficient to have a reasonable basis to conclude that the individuals were acting in an employment or professional capacity at the time that the footage was taken.
The appellant also disputes the need to provide notice under section 50(3) to the various media representatives, pointing to the practical difficulty of identifying who they are, and also to a distinction she feels can be drawn between the facts in this case and the facts before the Court in Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fineberg. The appellant submits:
[Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fineberg] dealt with a situation in which the records requested were solicitor’s accounts for Peter Doe. The Court held that he was entitled to notice on the basis that “[t]his is not a case where the respondent Peter Doe is simply someone whose name is connected with the document, but he is, in fact, the individual for whom the services were being performed which are the subject of all the documentation to which access is sought.” In this case, the media representatives were merely incidentally included in footage of the occupiers. The purpose of the records was not to conduct surveillance of them. They are analogous to “someone whose name is connected with the document,” not someone like Peter Doe who is the primary subject of the records. [appellant’s emphasis]
I concur with the appellant on both points.
Absent any evidence from the Ministry to suggest otherwise, it is simply not necessary to pause before concluding that the images of the various media representatives depicted in various photographs and videotapes are discharging their professional responsibilities. As such, the information is not about the media representatives in any personal sense, as required in order to fall within the scope of the definition of “personal information”. The only reasonable conclusion to reach in these circumstances is that the media representatives are depicted in their professional capacities, gathering footage on behalf of their employers in the context of newsworthy events taking place at Ipperwash in September 1995 (Orders P-1412 P-1621 and R-980015).
I also find that notice to the various media representatives under section 50(3) is not necessary.
By its own terms, a notice under section 50(3) is required where there is some prospect that the interests of a person may be adversely “affected” by the outcome of an appeal. The potentially affected interest must also relate to one of the confidentiality concerns recognized by the exemptions under the Act. For example, before responding to a request, section 28(1) of the Act requires the head of an institution to give notice before granting access to a record in one of two circumstances:
(a) where the head has reason to believe that the record might contain information referred to in subsection 17(1) that affects the interest of a person other than the person requesting information; or
(b) where the record contains personal information that the head has reason to believe might constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy for the purposes of clause 21(1)(f).
The Ministry did not notify any “affected party” at the request stage of this appeal.
On appeal, this office must also take care to ensure that persons are notified where there is a reasonable prospect that their interests may be affected by disclosure. However, that duty does not arise on every occasion that an individual’s name or other identifier is somehow associated with a record. It is not hard to envision how the processes of this office could quickly be brought to a standstill if every individual named or otherwise identified in a record, in whatever ever capacity, needed to be notified.
The longstanding practice of this office is not to notify individuals under section 50(3) where it is clear that their identities are associated with a record in a professional capacity and no personal privacy interest is implicated. That is the case here. To this extent, I agree with the appellant’s analogy of media representatives to “simply someone whose name is connected with the document” as stated by the Divisional Court in Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fineberg, and section 50(3) notice is therefore not required.
OPP Officers
The Ministry submits:
The audio portion of [FOI] Videotape 6 (the latter portion of the videotape …) contains the voices of two OPP officers, one of whom has retired since the recording was made. These two officers are carrying on a personal conversation that was captured unintentionally by the audio portion of the tape. The Ministry submits that their voices and the conversation is their personal information, and that this is consistent with past [Commissioner’s office] decisions on this subject.
The Ministry also takes the position that these individuals should be notified under section 50(3) for the same reasons as the media representatives.
The appellant points to a number of previous orders where it has been determined that information about police officers and others discharging professional responsibilities is not “personal information” for the purposes of section 2(1) (Orders P-289, P-1044, P-1113 as well as Interim Order PO-2054-I issued at an earlier stage of this appeal). The appellant also refers to Order PO-1843 where Adjudicator Sherry Liang found that records reflecting the substance of a discussion between a police officer and a school official contained “professional” rather than “personal” information, as that distinction has been described in previous orders. Although I made the Ministry aware of these orders, they were not referred to in the Ministry’s representations.
As far as notice under section 50(3) is concerned, the appellant reiterates her arguments with respect to the media representatives, and also submits that the Ministry has already given the OPP officers notice of this proceeding and consulted them in reaching its decision to deny access to the relevant portions of the videotape.
It is clear from the content of the FOI Videotape 6 that the OPP officers were on duty at Ipperwash taking still photographs of activity in the park at the time that the audio portion of the tape was recorded. It would appear that the video function of the camera had been turned off, but not the audio, and that the officers were not aware that the audiotape was still running. The officers’ conversation makes reference to activities taking place in the park at that time and to particular occupiers, and the sound of camera shutters is clearly present on the tape. Having listened carefully to the audiotape, in my view, the conversation taking place between the OPP officers consists of three types of information:
1. information that is not about any identifiable individual;
2. information about various occupiers, which is not the personal information of the OPP officers; and
3. information about the OPP officers and their colleagues and family members, which is the personal information of the OPP officers and others and not of the occupiers.
As far as the second type of information is concerned, although some specific occupiers are referred to in a descriptive way, in my view, no individual occupier can reasonably be personally identified on the basis of the information on the audiotape. Accordingly, I find that the portions of the tape containing type 1 and type 2 information do not contain “personal information” for the purposes of section 2(1); and the portions containing type 3 information contain the “personal information” of the OPP officers and other non-occupiers who may be identifiable on the basis of the information conveyed during the discussions.
FOI Videotape 6 is not time-coded, so I have identified the portions of the tape that contain type 3 information on the basis of the time elapsed since the beginning of the tape. The type 3 information begins approximately 17 minutes and 30 seconds into the tape, with the phrase “I saw John [] …”, and ends at approximately 20 minutes and 43 seconds, the second time one officer says “talk to you later”.
Turning to the notice requirements of section 50(3), I find that notice to the two OPP officers is not required. In Interim Order PO-2033-I, I dealt with a number of photographs and videotapes depicting OPP officers discharging professional responsibilities at Ipperwash. I made the following findings:
Category 2 photographs and videotapes