Access to Information Orders
Decision Information
The appellant submitted a request under the
Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act) to the Corporation of the Municipality of Red Lake (the Municipality) for access to:
…information relating to Municipal Tax Arrears and provide a complete list of all properties in Tax Arrears as of December 31, 2001.
As a Second List please provide the list of Properties which have been in Arrears for at least three years as of December 31, 2001, and the amount of Tax and Interest owing on each such property.
The Municipality issued a decision denying access to the requested record pursuant to sections 11 (economic and other interests), 14 (invasion of privacy) and 17(1.1) (frivolous and vexatious) of the
Act. The appellant appealed the unicipality’s decision.
Decision Content
NATURE OF THE APPEAL:
The appellant submitted a request under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act) to the Corporation of the Municipality of Red Lake (the Municipality) for access to:
…information relating to Municipal Tax Arrears and provide a complete list of all properties in Tax Arrears as of December 31, 2001.
As a Second List please provide the list of Properties which have been in Arrears for at least three years as of December 31, 2001, and the amount of Tax and Interest owing on each such property.
The Municipality issued a decision denying access to the requested record pursuant to sections 11 (economic and other interests), 14 (invasion of privacy) and 17(1.1) (frivolous and vexatious) of the Act. The appellant appealed the Municipality’s decision.
During mediation, the Municipality withdrew its reliance on section 17(1.1) of the Act and this section, therefore, is no longer at issue. Further mediation could not be effected and the appeal was forwarded to adjudication.
I first decided to seek representations from the Municipality, and sent it a Notice of Inquiry setting out the facts and issues at adjudication. The Municipality submitted representations in response. Upon review of them, I decided to seek representations from the appellant, but only with respect to the issues relating to whether or not the records contain personal information and if so, whether their disclosure would constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. I sent the appellant a copy of the Notice of Inquiry that was sent to the Municipality along with the complete representations of the Municipality. The appellant submitted representations in response.
RECORDS:
The record at issue is a computer printout, 19 pages in length and is comprised of a listing, by roll number, of all properties in tax arrears for three or more years as of December 31, 2001.
The printout contains a number of categories of information: Jurisdiction, Roll, As of Date, 3+ Arrears, 3+ Interest, 2 Arrears, 2Arrears Interest, 1 Arrears, 1Arrears Interest, Current, Current Penalty.
For the purpose of assessing the issues in this inquiry, the Municipality provided another copy of this record to me listing the names of the property owners, as opposed to the roll numbers. There is a slight variation in the names of the categories although the information recorded in each category is the same. In addition, this copy contains two additional categories: Miscellaneous and Total.
DISCUSSION:
PERSONAL INFORMATION
Personal information is defined in section 2(1) of the Act, in part, as “recorded information about an identifiable individual”, and includes:
(d) the address, telephone number, fingerprints or blood type of the individual,
...
(h) the individual's name if it appears with other personal information relating to the individual or where the disclosure of the name would reveal other personal information about the individual.
The appellant points out in its representations that it is only seeking information that is identified by Roll Number and submits that “the record as described contains no names or associated identifying personal information…”. Relying on Orders 80 and P-1538.rec (cited as R-980015), the appellant argues that: “the Association between a Name and a Tax Roll Number of a publicly available Municipal Tax Assessment Roll or on the Municipal Tax Arrears List does not constitute personal information”.
The Municipality submits that the record at issue contains the personal information of both individual and commercial property owners, apparently because “[the Municipality] is a small community and the release of this information, even if the list relates to property location only, would be identifiable to the individuals and commercial owners”.
The record at issue does not contain the names of any individual since the properties are identified by roll number only. Looking at the version of this record that the Municipality provided with its representations, which identifies the property by owner name, it is apparent that some of the properties on the list are owned by individuals, and some are owned by businesses.
Former Commission Sidney B. Linden first canvassed the meaning of “personal information” as it relates to individuals and business entities in Order 16. He stated that:
The use of the term "individual" in the Act makes it clear that the protection provided with respect to the privacy of personal information relates only to natural persons. Had the legislature intended "identifiable individual" to include a sole proprietorship, partnership, unincorporated associations or corporation, it could and would have used the appropriate language to make this clear. The types of information enumerated under subsection 2(1) of the Act as "personal information" when read in their entirety, lend further support to my conclusion that the term "personal information" relates only to natural persons.
I adopt this reasoning for the purposes of this appeal.
Orders 80 and R-980015 both contain additional discussions on the distinction between personal versus professional capacity. Neither of the appeals, which resulted in these orders, concerned municipal taxation and/or tax roll information. Accordingly, although they provide general guidance with respect to the issue, they do not support the appellant’s conclusions that none of the information in the records can qualify as personal information.
In Order R-980015, however, Adjudicator Donald Hale refers to Order 13, in which former Commissioner Linden discussed the meaning of the words “about an identifiable individual” in the context of information about municipal properties:
That case raised the question of whether a Ministry of Revenue record containing the municipal locations of certain properties and their estimated market values would constitute the property owners’ personal information when associated with the names of the property owners. Former Commissioner Linden found that it did not. The location of a property and its estimated market value was found to be information about the property, not information about an identifiable individual. If the name of an individual property owner were added to this information, it could not be said that the individual’s name “appear[ed] with other personal information relating to the individual” or “would reveal other personal information about the individual” within the meaning of paragraph (h) of the personal information definition in section 2(1) of the Act.
Again, the record and therefore, the findings in this order (relating to the market value of property) are distinguishable from the record at issue in the current appeal (relating to arrears in municipal taxes). As Assistant Commissioner Mitchinson noted in Order M-800 (which also pertained to a list of properties whose municipal taxes were in arrears):
Where a listing indicates that the property is owned by an individual or individuals, I find that the names, property addresses and associated entries for these listings qualify as personal information for the purposes of section 2(1) of the Act. Unlike other circumstances where the owner of a property may not be responsible for activities involving a property, municipal property taxes are the responsibility of the property owner, and if there are arrears it is always the owner whose name would appear on any arrears listing.
However, consistent with previous orders that have made a distinction between information about an individual and information about a “business entity”, he concluded:
Where a listing indicates that the owner of a property is a sole proprietorship, partnership, unincorporated associations or corporation and not a natural person, I find that the information contained in these listings does not qualify as personal information within the meaning of section 2(1) of the Act.
I agree with these conclusions and adopt them for the purposes of this appeal.