FINAL ORDER MO-1373-F

Appeal MA‑990085‑1

City of Hamilton

NATURE OF THE APPEAL:

This is my final order in Appeal MA-990085-1, which disposes of all issues not dealt with in Interim Order MO-1337-I.                                                                                    

This appeal involves a request by the appellant for access to 3,461 paper records, 88 photographs and two videotapes relating to fire prevention activities undertaken by City of Hamilton (the City) at a specified address (the property).  In Interim Order MO-1337-I, I found that a number of records qualified for exemption under sections 7, 8 or 12 of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act), and that others did not qualify for any exemptions claimed by the City.  I ordered the City to disclosure a large number of records to the appellant.

At the time I issued Interim Order MO-1337-I, the City had not made an access decision regarding Record 2634.  I ordered the City to do so.  The City issued a decision to the appellant in compliance with the order, disclosing the record upon payment of the required photocopy fee.  I also ordered the City to provide me with copies of 11 records that had not been sent to this Office.  The City has complied with this provision.

In its original decision letter, the City claimed section 14(1) (invasion of privacy) and/or section 10(1) (third party information) for certain identified records.  Because the City did not intend to disclose these records, none of the individuals or organizations whose interests could be affected by disclosure were notified.  During the course of my inquiry, I identified certain other records which could possibly contain personal or third party information.  In Interim Order MO-1337-I, I deferred consideration of these records, pending notification of the individuals (the affected persons) and organizations (the affected parties).  I sent a Supplementary Notice of Inquiry to each of the 11 affected persons and 13 affected parties, as well as the City and the appellant, providing them with an opportunity to provide written representations on the section 14(1) and/or section 10(1) exemption claims. 

Neither the City nor the appellant chose to provide representations, although the City’s representations in response to the original Notice of Inquiry addressed both of these exemption claims, and I will take these original representations into account in this final order. None of the affected persons and only two affected parties submitted representations.  One affected party objected to the disclosure of any information and another affected party consented to the disclosure of information pertaining to that organization.

Interim Order MO-1337-I attached an Appendix A, which lists all of the records at issue in the appeal, together with the exemption claims and decisions regarding each record.  I have attached an amended appendix to this final order (Appendix B), which updates the listing to include records which were not dealt with until this final order.

DISCUSSION:

PRELIMINARY ISSUES

Provision 4 of Interim Order MO-1337-I required the City to provide me with a copy of Records 456, 457-458, 490-495, 665-666, 746-749, 798, 1358-1359, 1452, 2460-2462, 2664-2666 and 3103-3104.  The City complied with this provision, and I will deal with these records first.

Litigation Privilege

The City claimed that a number of these records are exempt under the litigation privilege component of section 12.  In Interim Order MO-1337-I, I discussed the change in the law in this area and reviewed the dominant purpose test for litigation privilege as set out in General Accident Assurance Co. v. Chrusz (1999), 45 O.R. (3d) 321 (Ont. C.A.).  I also reviewed the City’s submissions in significant detail and applied the dominant purpose test to the facts in the appeal.  I do not intend to repeat that discussion here as the City did not make new representations on this issue. 

Record 456 is a duplicate of Record 443.  In Interim Order MO-1337-I, I found that Record 443 did not qualify for exemption under the litigation privilege component of section 12, and I now make the same finding for Record 456 for the same reasons. 

Records 3103-3104 consists of Business Names Reports for two organizations.  These reports clearly do not meet the requirements for litigation privilege, and do not qualify for exemption under section 12.

Records 457-458 is a facsimile cover sheet from Fire Department personnel to a City lawyer.  Records 665-666 and 798 consists of a facsimile and a letter between an affected person and Fire Department or City personnel.  Records 1358-1359 is a note to file prepared by Fire Department personnel regarding the removal of a trailer from the property.  Record 1452 is a handwritten note to file by Fire Department personnel.  Records 2664-2666 consists of a facsimile from a security company to a named individual at the property.  All of these records concern proceedings involving the property which have been concluded.  For this reason, I find that they do not satisfy the “dominant purpose” test.  Also, none of these records are appropriately characterized as “non-privileged documents that find their way into the lawyer’s brief for litigation”. 

Accordingly, I find that Records 456, 457-458, 665-666, 798, 1358-1359, 1452, 2664-2666 and 3103-3104 do not qualify for exemption under the litigation privilege component of section 12 of the Act.

Solicitor-Client Communication Privilege

The City claimed solicitor-client communication privilege as one basis for exempting Records 490-495 and 746-749.  These records consist of an e-mail message and a facsimile, both with various documents attached, sent and received by a City lawyer and Fire Department personnel.  I am satisfied that there is a solicitor-client relationship between these individuals, and that the subject matter of the records relates directly to the seeking or the giving of confidential legal advice regarding issues surrounding the property.  Therefore, Records 490-495 and 746-749 qualify for exemption under the solicitor-client communication privilege component of section 12 of the Act.

Section 8(2)(a)

Records 2460-2462 is a letter sent by Fire Department personnel to the Fire Marshal’s Office

regarding activity at the property.  They are similar in nature to other records dealt with in Interim Order MO-1337-I, which I characterized as “status reports” concerning Fire Department activities pursuant to the Fire Prevention and Protection Act, 1997.  Like those records, I find that Records 2460-2462 constitute a “report” for the purposes of section 8(2)(a) of the Act which was prepared by a body which has the function of enforcing and regulating compliance with a law, and therefore qualify for exemption under section 8(2)(a).

Record 1452 is a note to file created by Fire Department personnel and details day-to-day occurrences taking place at the property.  I find that this record contains statements of fact or observations, and is not accurately considered to be a formal statement or account of the collation or consideration of inspection activities of the Fire Department.  For this reason, this record is not a “report” and does not qualify for exemption under section 8(2)(a) of the Act.

By way of summary, Records 490-495 and 746-749 qualify for exemption under section 12 of the Act, and Records 2460-2462 under section 8(2)(a) of the Act.

The following other records do not qualify for exemption and should be disclosed to the appellant.

Records 456, 457-458, 665-666, 798, 1358-1359, 1452, 2664-2666 and 3103-3104

PERSONAL INFORMATION

The section 14(1) personal privacy exemption applies only to information which qualifies as “personal information”.  Section 2(1) of the Act defines “personal information”, in part, to mean recorded information about an identifiable individual, including any identifying number assigned to the individual [paragraph (c)] and the individual's name where it appears with other personal information relating to the individual or where the disclosure of the name would reveal other personal information about the individual [paragraph (h)].

In Interim Order MO-1337-I, I divided the records that might contain personal information into two groups: (1)  records relating to the owner/director/officers of the property;  and (2) records pertaining to other individuals, including Fire Department personnel and representatives of various organizations.  It is unnecessary for me to retain this distinction for the purposes of this final order.

Personal information vs. professional information

Previous decisions of this Office have drawn a distinction between an individual’s personal, and professional or official government capacity, and found that, in most circumstances, information associated with a person in his or her professional or official government capacity will not be considered to be “about the individual” within the meaning of section 2(1) definition of “personal information” (Orders P-257, P-427, P-1412 and P-1621).

The orders dealing with non-government employees, professional or corporate officers treat the issue of “personal information” in much the same way as those dealing with government employees.  The seminal order in this respect is Order 80.  In that case, former Commissioner Sidney B. Linden rejected the institution’s submission and found:

All pieces of correspondence concern corporate, as opposed to personal, matters (i.e. funding procedures for COMA [Council On Mind Abuse]), as evidenced by the following: the letters from COMA to the institution are on official corporate letterhead and are signed by an individual in his capacity as corporate representative of COMA; and the letter of response from the institution is sent to an individual in his corporate capacity.  In my view, the names of these officers should properly be categorized as “corporate information” rather than” information” under the circumstances.

In Reconsideration Order R-980015, Adjudicator Donald Hale reviewed the history of this Office’s approach to this issue and the underlying rationale.  He also extensively examined the approaches taken by other jurisdictions and considered the effect of the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Dagg v. Canada (Minister of Finance) (1997), 148 D.L.R. (4th) 385.  In applying the principles which he described in that order, Adjudicator Hale came to the following conclusions:

I find that the information associated with the names of the affected persons which is contained in the records at issue relates to them only in their capacities as officials with the organizations which employ them.  Their involvement in the issues addressed in the correspondence with the Ministry is not personal to them but, rather, relates to their employment or association with the organizations whose interests they are representing.  This information is not personal in nature but may be more appropriately described as being related to the employment or professional responsibilities of each of the individuals who are identified therein.  Essentially, the information is not about these individuals and, therefore, does not qualify as their “personal information” within the meaning of the opening words of the definition.

In order for an organization, public or private, to give voice to its views on a subject of interest to it, individuals must be given responsibility for speaking on its behalf.  I find that the views which these individuals express take place in the context of their employment responsibilities and are not, accordingly, their personal opinions within the definition of personal information contained in section 2(1)(e) of the Act.  Nor is the information “about” the individual, for the reasons described above.  In my view, the individuals expressing the position of an organization, in the context of a public or private organization, act simply as a conduit between the intended recipient of the communication and the organization which they represent.  The voice is that of the organization, expressed through its spokesperson, rather than that of the individual delivering the message.

In the present situation, I find that the records do not contain the personal opinions of the affected persons.  Rather, as evidenced by the contents of the records themselves, each of these individuals is giving voice to the views of the organization which he/she represents.  In my view, it cannot be said that the affected persons are communicating their personal opinions on the subjects addressed in the records.  Accordingly, I find that this information cannot properly be characterized as falling within the ambit of the term “personal opinions or views” within the meaning of section 2(1)(e).

I agree with the above analysis and I find that it is applicable in the circumstances of this appeal.  The records relating to the owner, directors or officers of the property pertain exclusively to their responsibilities and liabilities as owners, directors and officers.  Similarly, the records pertaining to other individuals, including Fire Department personnel or representatives from other organizations, relate only to their roles as representatives of these various organizations.

Adopting the reasoning from past orders on this issue, I find that none of the records at issue in this appeal contain personal information, as defined in section 2(1) of the Act.  Because the section 14(1) exemption can only apply to records containing personal information, it has no application in the circumstances of this appeal. 

Accordingly, the following records, which are not subject to other exemption claims, should be disclosed to the appellant.

Records 163, 170, 209, 231, 234, 237-238, 284, 285, 290, 303, 320, 326, 339-340, 345, 359, 371, 390-391, 469, 470-471, 513-514, 522, 526, 543-544, 545, 577, 580, 591-592, 593, 605-607, 609, 611-612, 617, 620, 629, 694-695, 752-753, 754-758, 775-776, 809-811, 812, 832-833, 842-844, 1219, 1232, 1241, 1250, 1324-1325, 1344-1345, 1445-1446, 1633, 1692-1698, 1726-1727, 1737-1740, 1741-1744, 1752-1753, 1788, 1793-1795, 1796-1797, 1825, 1826, 1827-1828, 1833-1834, 2152, 2167, 2392, 2429-2433, 2444-2445, 2532-2534, 2587-2589, 2645, 2674, 2676-2677, 2681-2683, 2684-2688, 2723-2726, 2747-2750, 2782, 2805, 2877, 2907, 2913-2915, 3018-3020, 3021-3027, 3028-3030, 3222-3224, 3259-3262, 3264-3270, 3271-3274, 3353, 3422, 3426, 3431, 3436-3439, 3440-3446 and 3448.

THIRD PARTY INFORMATION

The City claimed that a number of the records were exempt under subsections 10(1)(a), (b), and (c) of the Act.  I identified other similar records, and reserved my finding on these two groups of records until the affected parties were notified and given an opportunity to provide representations.

For a record to qualify for exemption under sections 10(1)(a), (b) or (c), the City and/or the affected parties must satisfy each part of the following three-part test:

1.         the record must reveal information that is a trade secret or scientific, technical, commercial, financial or labour relations information;  and

2.         the information must have been supplied to the City in confidence, either implicitly or explicitly;  and

3.         the prospect of disclosure of the record must give rise to a reasonable expectation that one of the harms specified in (a), (b) or (c) of subsection 10(1) will occur.

(Orders 36, P-363, M-29 and M-37)

The Court of Appeal for Ontario, in upholding my Order P‑373 stated:

With respect to Part 1 of the test for exemption, the Commissioner adopted a meaning of the terms which is consistent with his previous orders, previous court decisions and dictionary meaning.  His interpretation cannot be said to be unreasonable.  With respect to Part 2, the records themselves do not reveal any information supplied by the employers on the various forms provided to the WCB.  The records had been generated by the WCB based on data supplied by the employers.  The Commissioner acted reasonably and in accordance with the language of the statute in determining that disclosure of the records would not reveal information supplied in confidence to the WCB by the employers.  Lastly, as to Part 3, the use of the words “detailed and convincing” do not modify the interpretation of the exemption or change the standard of proof.  These words simply describe the quality and cogency of the evidence required to satisfy the onus of establishing reasonable expectation of harm.  Similar expressions have been used by the Supreme Court of Canada to describe the quality of evidence required to satisfy the burden of proof in civil cases.  If the evidence lacks detail and is unconvincing, it fails to satisfy the onus and the information would have to be disclosed.  It was the Commissioner’s function to weigh the material.  Again it cannot be said that the Commissioner acted unreasonably.  Nor was it unreasonable for him to conclude that the submissions amounted, at most, to speculation of possible harm.  [emphasis added]

(Ontario (Workers' Compensation Board) v. Ontario (Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner) (1998), 41 O.R. (3d) 464 at 476 (C.A.), reversing (1995), 23 O.R. (3d) 31 (Div. Ct.))

The City submits:

Records 2964 to 3004 are comprised of a report prepared by a third party, in which the present and future use of the subject premises is evaluated.  There is reference to the high cost of the study, due to the sensitive nature of the work and the media focus on the subject property.

Records 305 to 308, to which access was denied under section 10(1)(a) of the Act, clearly state a "Confidentiality Caution" indicating the information supplied is intended "... for the use of the individual or entity to which it is address..."

The one affected party who objected to disclosure of information states:

Information supplied by [the Commissioner’s Office] does not provide sufficient detail to determine what letters, reports, memos, etc. produced by [the affected party] are within the items requested.  Only one letter from our firm was sent to the Hamilton Fire Department.  All remaining correspondence, etc. was sent to our client.

Our client [a named individual and named organization] should be contacted.  We are not in a position to release information supplied in confidence to our client.

The reports, letters, etc. provided to our client were provided in confidence.  The release of this material could harm our relationship with present and future clients...

The bulk of material produced was not to be released to The City of Hamilton by agreement with our client.  It was released to The City without our knowledge or agreement.

[The affected party] has not been compensated for the work completed for [the named individual and named organization].  Proceedings were started to obtain compensation.  Release of our documents will hinder our ability to continue future proceedings to gain compensation for our work.

I did provide notice to the named individual and the named organization referred to in the affected party's representations.  However, neither of them submitted representations.

As stated above, one affected party consented to the disclosure of any information relating to it.  This information is included in Records 1631-1632 and, because no other exemptions apply to these records, they should be disclosed to the appellant. 

I have separated the remaining records into the following seven groups, based on type:

Notes to File - Records 264-265, 267, 293-294, 295, 298-299, 309, 312, 323-324, 332-333, 338, 354, 355, 372-373, 419-421, 425-426, 440, 442, 507-508, 528, 645-654, 667-669, 716, 730-732, 741-745, 766-768, 781-782, 784, 785-791, 817-819, 825-829, 830-831, 852-860, 1464-1465, 1541-1542, 1585, 1590, 1596-1598 and 1659-1661.

Letters Containing Pricing Information - Records 430, 481-482, 485-489, 523-524, 599-601, 621-628, 639-644, 655-664, 696-698, 702-708, 723-724, 725-728, 733, 777-779, 799-800, 801-804, 805-808, 1263-1264, 1449, 2393-2395, 2396-2398, 3009-3016 and 3031-3034.

Letters Containing No Pricing Information - Records 305-308, 475-480, 483, 509-510, 512, 542, 578-579, 581, 582, 583-584, 585-588, 596-598, 618-619, 683, 684, 685, 688-689, 699-701, 737-740, 750-751, 1525, 1526-1532, 1533-1535, 1536-1538, 1539-1540, 1586-1588, 2422-2423, 2434-2438, 3051-3055, 3056-3063, 3216-3221 and 3225-3237.

Contracts and Agreements - Records 496-504, 673-682, 717-721, 1406-1410, 1411-1413, 1415-1418, 1469-1477 and 1931.

Proposal and Tender Information - Records 864, 867-869, 870-872, 873-885, 886-897, 1216-1218, 1220-1228, 1229-1231, 1233-1237, 1238-1240, 1242-1246, 1247-1249, 1251-1255, 1256-1260, 1284, 1286-1287, 1311, 1454-1455, 1456-1458, 1463, 1466-1467, 1490-1491, 1510, 1565-1569, 1570-1574, 1580-1581, 1582, 1599-1601, 1602-1607, 1608-1614, 1615-1616, 1617-1626, 1627, 1628, 1629-1630 and 1647.  (These records include: Form of Proposals, Form of Tenders, quotations, estimates and miscellaneous documents relating to the prior.)

Reports - Records 1543-1564 and 2964-3004.

Invoices - Records 630-635, 638, 709-710, 792-794 and 1422-1423.

Part 1:  Type of Information

Notes to File /Letters Containing No Pricing Information

The “Notes to File” consist of handwritten notes made by various Fire Department personnel.  These records appear to have been created on a daily basis, and record observations, conversations and actions taken by Fire Department personnel in their dealings with various affected parties concerning issues the removal, storage or sale of goods at the property.  Some of these records reflect discussions with the director/owner of the property.   Neither the City nor the affected party provided representations on the type of information contained in these records and, upon review, I find that the only type of information among those listed in section 10(1) with potential application is “commercial” information.

To qualify as “commercial” information, it must “relate solely to the buying, selling or exchange of merchandise or services” (Order P-493).  None of the “Notes to File” meet this definition.  They all reflect general discussions about various issues involving the property.

“Containing No Pricing Information” fall into the same category.  They consist of correspondence between certain affected parties, affected persons and Fire Department personnel, and involve general discussions of issues relating to the property.

I find that none of the records in these two groups contain “commercial” information or any other types of information listed in section 10(1).  Therefore, the first part of the exemption test has not been established, and these records do not qualify for exemption under section 10(1) of the Act.

Letters with Pricing Information/Contracts and Agreements/Proposal and Tender Information/Invoices

All records in these four groups deal with the sale of goods or services relating to the property, including pricing information; inventory details; contracts and agreements between affected parties and other organizations or affected parties and the City; proposals or tenders prepared by affected parties in response to the City’s requests for proposal and tenders; and invoices relating to these activities.  I find that these records contain information which relates to the buying and selling of goods and services and, accordingly, they contain “commercial” information as that term is used in section 10(1) of the Act.

Reports

These records are reports prepared by two different affected parties, both of whom are engineers, which discuss the property, its usage and possible improvements to the property.  They include detailed electrical and structural discussions. 

This Office has defined technical information to mean:

... information belonging to an organized field of knowledge which would fall under the general categories of applied sciences or mechanical arts.  Examples of these fields would include architecture, engineering or electronics. ... [Technical information] will usually involve information prepared by a professional in the field and describe the construction, operation or maintenance of a structure, process, equipment or thing. (Order P-454)

I find that the reports satisfy this definition of “technical” information.

Part 2:  Supplied in Confidence

In order to satisfy the second part of the test, the City and/or the affected parties must show that the information was supplied to the City, either implicitly or explicitly in confidence.  Information contained in a record will be said to have been "supplied" to an institution, if its disclosure would permit the drawing of accurate inferences with respect to the information actually supplied to the City (Orders P-179, P-203, PO-1802 and PO-1816).

Supplied

Notes to File

All Notes to File were prepared by various Fire Department personnel.  The notes themselves were clearly not “supplied” by any affected party and, having reviewed their content, I find that none of them reflect information so supplied, nor would anyone be able to draw accurate inferences about any information supplied by the affected parties should the notes be disclosed.  Therefore, all records in this group do not meet the “supplied” component of the second part of the section 10(1) exemption test.

Letters With Pricing Information/Letters Without Pricing Information

These records consist of correspondence exchanged between Fire Department/City personnel and various affected parties.  I find that only those letters authored by the affected parties were “supplied” within the meaning of section 10(1).

Contracts and Agreements

Because the information in a contract is typically the product of a negotiation process between two parties, the content of contracts involving an institution and an affected party will not normally qualify as having been “supplied” for the purposes of section 10(1) of the Act.  Records of this nature have been the subject of a number of past orders of this Office.  In general, the conclusions reached in these orders is that for such information to have been “supplied”, it must be the same as that originally provided by the affected party, not information that has resulted from negotiations between the institution and the affected party.  If disclosure of a record would reveal information actually supplied by an affected party, or if disclosure would permit the drawing of accurate inferences with respect to this type of information, then past orders have also found that this information satisfies the requirements of the “supplied” portion of the second requirement of the section 10(1) exemption test (see, for example, Orders P-36, P-204, P-251 and P-1105).

Records 717-721 constitute an agreement between the Fire Department and an affected party.  Records 1406-1410, 1411-1413, 1415-1418 and 1469-1477 are all contracts between the City and an affected party.  Based on my review of the contents of these records, I find that the contracts and agreements were the result of negotiations between the various parties, and that none of these records was “supplied” for the purposes of section 10(1) of the Act (Orders P-1545 and PO-1698).

On the other hand, Records 496-504, 673-682 and 1931 are agreements between affected parties and organizations other than the City or the Fire Department.  These agreements appear to have been negotiated without any involvement of the City or Fire Department, and then forwarded to them by certain affected parties.  I find that these records consist of information originally provided by the affected parties, and therefore, were “supplied” for the purposes of section 10(1).

Reports/Proposals and Tenders/Invoices

Records 2964-3004 consist of a report prepared by the one affected party, an engineering firm, who provided representations in response to the Notice of Inquiry.  These representations are summarized at the beginning of the section 10(1) discussion.  Through a review of other records, I have been able to confirm that this report was prepared for another affected party, who was a client of the engineering firm, and provided to the Fire Department by this client.  Records 1543-1564 is another report prepared by a different engineering firm.  This firm was notified as an affected party but did not provide representations.  I have also been able to confirm that this report was provided to the Fire Department by the same affected party, who was also a client of this second engineering firm.  Although the reports were prepared for two different affected parties, they were provided to the Fire Department by these parties during the course of dealing with issues involving the property.  I find that both reports were “supplied” for the purposes of section 10(1).

Similarly, I find that all of the records containing proposal and tender information, as well as all invoices, were “supplied” to the City in the context of various activities taking place at the property under the direction of the City.

In Confidence

As far as the “in confidence” component is concerned, the City and/or the affected party must demonstrate a reasonable expectation of confidentiality on the part of the affected parties at the time that the various records were provided to the City.  The expectation of confidentiality must be based on reasonable and objective grounds, and can arise either implicitly or explicitly (Order M-169).

In making a determination on the issue of confidentiality, I must consider all the circumstances of the case, including whether the information was:

(1)        Communicated to the City on the basis that it was confidential and that it was to be kept confidential.

(2)        Treated consistently in a manner that indicates a concern for its protection from disclosure by the affected parties prior to being communicated to the government organization.

(3)        Not otherwise disclosed or available from sources to which the public has access.

(4)        Prepared for a purpose which would not entail disclosure.

(Order P-561)

Notes to File/Letters With Pricing Information/Letters Without Pricing Information/Contracts and Agreements/Proposal and Tender Information/Invoices

I have no evidence before me in this appeal to substantiate an implicit expectation of confidentiality on the part of any of the affected parties whose information is contained in the documents in these six groups.

The only evidence of an explicit expectation of confidentiality consists of the standard cover page on certain facsimiles, asking that the information be read only by the person to whom the facsimile is addressed.  I find that these confidentiality cautions are not relevant to the intended recipient of the facsimile transmission, and have no application in the context of this appeal.

Therefore, the confidentiality component of the second part of the section 10(1) exemption test has not been established for any records in these six groups.

Reports

Although the affected party engineering firm who provided representations submits that the report was provided to its client in confidence, the relevant relationship of confidentiality for the purposes of section 10(1) is between the supplier of the information to the City/Fire Department and the institution itself.  The affected party’s client, although notified, did not provide representations in this appeal, and the City’s representations, although identifying “the sensitive nature of the work and media focus on the subject property”, are not sufficient to establish the confidentiality requirements outlined above.

Records 1543-1564 includes a note from the affected party, a different engineering firm, to Fire Department personnel stating, "Please keep this report in strictest confidence."  Although the City does not address this record in its representations, given the nature of the records, I am prepared to accept that it was submitted by the affected party with a reasonably-held expectation that it would of treated confidentially by the Fire Department.

In summary, I find that only Records 1543-1564 satisfy the requirements of part two of the section 10(1) exemption test.

Part 3:  Reasonable Expectation of Harm 

To discharge the burden of proof under the third part of the test, the City and/or affected parties must present evidence that is detailed and convincing, and must describe a set of facts and circumstances that could lead to a reasonable expectation that one or more of the harms described in section 10(1) would occur if the information was disclosed (Order P-373).

The words "could reasonably be expected to" appear in the preamble of section 10(1), as well as in several other exemptions under the Act dealing with a wide variety of anticipated "harms".  In the case of most of these exemptions, including section 10(1), in order to establish that the particular harm in question "could reasonably be expected" to result from disclosure of a record, the party with the burden of proof must provide "detailed and convincing" evidence to establish a "reasonable expectation of probable harm" (see Order P‑373, two court decisions on judicial review of that order in Ontario (Workers Compensation Board) v. Ontario (Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner) (1998), 41 O.R. (3d) 464 at 476 (C.A.), reversing (1995), 23 O.R. (3d) 31 at 40 (Div. Ct.), as well as Orders PO-1745 and PO-1747).

The only records for which I have been provided with some evidence on the harms aspect of section 10(1) are Records 2964-3004, which I have already found do not satisfy the “supplied in confidence” component of section 10(1).  The City’s representations do not deal with this part of the test, and the representations of the affected party, quoted earlier in this order, focus on concerns that it has not yet been paid by its client for the work in organizing and writing the report.  The affected party alleges that its interests will be harmed because disclosure of the documents would hinder their ability to continue future proceedings to gain compensation for the work done.  I find that the evidence and argument provided by the City and the affected party are not sufficiently “detailed and convincing” to establish a reasonable expectation of probable harm if the information contained in Records 2964-3004 is disclosed.  The affected party’s allegation of harm is at best speculative and not supported by any evidence or argument provided in its representations.

I have no evidence to establish the required harm for Records 1543-1564, the only records that meet both of the first two requirements of the section 10(1) exemption claim, and I find that these records do not qualify for exemption on that basis.

Therefore, I find that none of the records qualify for exemption under sections 10(1)(a), (b) or (c) of the Act, and the following records, which are not subject to other exemption claims, should be disclosed to the appellant:

Records 264-265, 267, 293-294, 295, 305-308, 332-333, 355, 419-421, 425-426, 430, 475-480, 481-482, 483, 485-489, 496-504, 507-508, 509-510, 512, 523-524, 542, 581, 582, 583-584, 585-588, 599-601, 618-619, 630-635, 638, 639-644, 645-654, 655-664, 673-682, 683, 684, 685, 688-689, 696-698, 699-701, 702-708, 709-710, 716, 717-721, 723-724, 725-728, 730-732, 733, 737-740, 741-745, 750-751, 766-768, 777-779, 792-794, 799-800, 801-804, 805-808, 817-819, 825-829, 830-831, 852-860, 864, 867-869, 870-872, 873-885, 886-897, 1216-1218, 1220-1228, 1229-1231, 1233-1237, 1238-1240, 1242-1246, 1247-1249, 1251-1255, 1256-1260, 1263-1264, 1311, 1406-1410, 1422-1423, 1449, 1454-1455, 1456-1458, 1463, 1464-1465, 1466-1467, 1469-1477, 1490-1491, 1510, 1525, 1526-1532, 1533-1535, 1536-1538, 1539-1540, 1543-1564, 1565-1569, 1570-1574, 1580-1581, 1582, 1586-1588, 1590, 1599-1601, 1602-1607, 1608-1614, 1615-1616, 1617-1626, 1627, 1628, 1629-1630, 1647, 1659-1661, 1931, 2393-2395, 2396-2398, 2422-2423, 3031-3034, 3051-3055, 3056-3063, 3216-3221 and 3225-3237.

The City claimed sections 8(2)(a) or (c), 8(1)(a), (b) or (c) and/or 7(1) of the Act for certain records that I did not deal with in Interim Order M-1337-I.  I will now deal with these remaining issues for all records that I have not found to otherwise qualify for exemption.

LAW ENFORCEMENT

Section 8(2)(a)

Section 8(2)(a) states:

A head may refuse to disclose a record,

that is a report prepared in the course of law enforcement, inspections or investigations by an agency which has the function of enforcing and regulating compliance with a law;

In order for a record to qualify for exemption under section 8(2)(a) of the Act, the City must satisfy each part of the following three-part test:

1.         the record must be a report;  and

2.         the report must have been prepared in the course of law enforcement, inspections or investigations;  and

3.         the report must have been prepared by an agency which has the function of enforcing and regulating compliance with a law.

(Orders 200 and P-324)

I addressed the City’s section 8(2)(a) claim in detail in Interim Order MO-1337-I, so I will only provide a brief summary of the various requirements of the test.

Part one of the test requires a record be a report.  In making this determination, I will consider the substance and nature of the records, and assess whether they consist of a “formal statement or account of the results of a collation and consideration of information”, as opposed to a “mere observation or recording of facts”.

Part two of the test requires that the report be prepared in the course of law enforcement, inspections or investigations.  Certain fire safety-related inspection activities took place at the property, and a number of records were prepared in this context.  I will be reviewing the various records determining whether I am satisfied that each of them was prepared in the course of these inspection activities.

And finally, part three of the test requires that the report was prepared by an agency which has the function of enforcing and regulating compliance with a law.  In Interim Order MO-1337-I, I found that this part of the test was satisfied in relation to the fire safety-related inspection activity, because the Fire Department has a mandate to enforce and regulate compliance with a law, namely the Fire Code, under the Fire Prevention and Protection Act, 1997 and the Fire Marshals Act.

Application of the test

I have divided the records into four groups based on type.

Letters - Records 517-518, 519, 525, 527, 596-598, 621-628, 686-687, 759-765, 1284-1285, 2170-2172, 2197-2198, 2383, 2384-2386, 2401-2405, 2406-2414, 2417-2418, 2434-2438, 2463-2466, 2468-2487, 2521-2523, 2524-2529, 2548-2549, 2560-2561, 2562-2563, 2566-2570, 2576-2577, 2591-2604, 2606-2614, 2636, 2646-2652, 2655, 2667, 2756-2760, 2764, 2841-2869, 2905-2906, 2909-2911, 2924-2928, 3005, 3009-3016, 3035-3036, 3037, 3038, 3045-3046, 3065-3066, 3085-3087, 3238-3244, 3321-3323, 3326-3328, 3329-3330, 3392-3393, 3394-3396 and 3407-3409.

Records 621-628, 759-765, 1284-1285, 2384-2386, 2417-2418, 2463-2466, 2468-2487, 2566-2570, 2576-2577 and 2655 were all written by affected parties, affected persons or other organizations to Fire Department or City personnel.  There is no evidence to suggest that the authors of these letters are agencies that have the function of enforcing and regulating compliance with a law, nor that the records in question were prepared “in the course of law enforcement, investigations or inspections”.  As a result, I find parts two and three of the test have not been established, and these records do not qualify for exemption under section 8(2)(a).

Records 2591-2604 consists of a package of materials along with a covering letter, which was sent by Fire Department personnel to the Fire Marshal’s Office regarding activity at the property.  These records are similar in nature to other records dealt with in Interim Order MO-1337-I, which I characterized as “status reports” concerning Fire Department activities pursuant to the Fire Prevention and Protection Act, 1997.  Like those records, I find that Records 2591-2604 constitute a “report” for the purposes of section 8(2)(a) of the Act which was prepared by a body which has the function of enforcing and regulating compliance with a law, and therefore qualify for exemption under section 8(2)(a).

The remaining records in this group consist of letters by Fire Department or City personnel to various affected parties or affected persons.  These letters are in response to correspondence received from these individuals or organizations, or explain Fire Department activity at the property.  None of the information in these records consists of a formal statement or account of the results of a collation and consideration of information, and therefore the first part of the test has not been established, and these records do not qualify for exemption under section 8(2)(a) of the Act.

Notes to File - Records 183-184, 186, 191-192, 194, 195, 197-198, 216-217, 221, 232-233, 239, 278-279, 283, 309, 313-314, 316-317, 322, 323-324, 328-329, 330-331, 338, 342, 353, 354, 372-373, 440, 442, 459-460, 461-462, 528, 667-669, 781-782, 784, 785-791, 1541-1542, 1585, 1596-1598, 1659-1661, 1681-1687, 1703-1709, 1938-1942, 2657-2661, 2879-2901, 3417, 3418, 3423-3425, 3433 and 3434.

All of the records in this group consist of notes to file, some with attached documents that were created by Fire Department personnel and detail day-to-day occurrences taking place at the property.  I find that these records contain statements of fact or observations, and are not accurately considered formal statements or accounts of the collation or consideration of inspection activities of the Fire Department.  For this reason, these records are not “”and do not qualify for exemption under section 8(2)(a) of the Act.

E-Mails - Records 165, 2247, 2551 and 3343.

These four records are e-mails between City and Fire Department personnel.  They too consist of facts or observations, not formal statements or accounts of the results of a collation and consideration of information.  For this reason, these records are not “reports”, and do not qualify for exemption under section 8(2)(a).

Other Records - Records 1678-1680, 2552-2554, 2616-2619, 2800 and 2964-3004.

Records 1678-1680 and 2552-2554 are Information Sheets prepared by the Fire Department.  These records appear to have been produced for the purposes of informing Fire Department personnel of activities involving the property.  These records only contain statements of fact.  There is no formal account of the results of a collation or consideration of information, so these records cannot be characterized as “reports”, and do not qualify for exemption under section 8(2)(a).

Records 2616-2619 comprise an agreement between an affected person and the Fire Department.  There is nothing before me to suggest that this person represents “an agency which has the function of enforcing and regulating compliance with a law” and, therefore, I find that the second and third parts of the test have not been established and these records do not qualify for exemption under section 8(2)(a).

Record 2800 is a draft Fire Marshal Order.  It does not contain a formal account of the results of a collation and consideration of information.  As such, it is not a “report”, and does not qualify for exemption under section 8(2)(a).

Records 2964-3004 is an engineering report prepared by an affected party regarding the property.  There is nothing before me to suggest that this affected party is “an agency which has the function of enforcing and regulating compliance with a law” and, therefore, I find that the second and third parts of the test have not been established and these records do not qualify for exemption under section 8(2)(a).

To summarize, the only records that qualify for exemption under section 8(2)(a) of the Act are Records 2591-2604.

The following records, which are not subject to other exemption claims, should be disclosed to the appellant:

Records 165, 183-184, 186, 195, 197-198, 216-217, 221, 232-233, 278-279, 283, 313-314, 316-317, 322, 323-324, 328-329, 330-331, 338, 342, 353, 354, 442, 459-460, 461-462, 517-518, 519, 525, 527, 528, 621-628, 667-669, 686-687, 781-782, 784, 785-791, 1541-1542, 1585, 1678-1680, 1681, 1682-1683, 1684, 1685, 1686-1687, 1703-1709, 1938-1942, 2197-2198, 2247, 2383, 2384-2386, 2401-2405, 2406-2414, 2417-2418, 2463-2466, 2468-2487, 2521-2523, 2524-2529, 2548-2549, 2551, 2552-2554, 2560-2561, 2562-2563, 2566-2570, 2576-2577, 2606-2614, 2616-2619, 2636, 2655, 2667, 2756-2760, 2764, 2841-2869, 2879-2901, 2905-2906, 2909-2911, 2924-2928, 2964-3004, 3009-3016, 3035-3036, 3037, 3038, 3045-3046, 3065-3066, 3085-3087, 3238-3244, 3321-3323, 3326-3328, 3329-3330, 3343, 3392-3393, 3394-3396, 3407-3409, 3417, 3418, 3423-3425, 3433 and 3434.

Section 8(2)(c)

Section 8(2)(c) of the Act states:

A head may refuse to disclose a record,

that is a law enforcement record if the disclosure could reasonably be expected to expose the author of the record or any person who has been quoted or paraphrased in the record to civil liability;

Senior Adjudicator David Goodis in Order PO-1747 made the following statement regarding the determination of whether disclosure of a record could reasonably be expected to result in the type of harm described in section 8(2)(c):

The words “could reasonably be expected to” appear in the preamble of section 14(1) [the equivalent provision to section 8(1) found in the provincial Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act], as well as in several other exemptions under the Act dealing with a wide variety of anticipated “harms”.  In the case of most of these exemptions, in order to establish that the particular harm in question “could reasonably be expected” to result from disclosure of a record, the party with the burden of proof must provide “detailed and convincing” evidence to establish a “reasonable expectation of probable harm” (see Order P-373, two court decisions on judicial review of that order in Ontario (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Ontario (Assistant Information and Privacy Commissioner) (1998), 41 O.R. (3d) 464 at 476 (C.A.), reversing (1995), 23 O.R. (3d) 31 at 40 (Div. Ct.)).

In my view, this is the proper test to apply to the records which are subject to the section 8(2)(c) exemption claim, specifically Records 239, 298-299, 309, 312 and 461-462.

All of these records are notes to file prepared by Fire Department personnel.  These particular notes detail discussions that Fire Department personnel had with the various affected parties.  I received no representations on these records or exemption claims from the City or any of the affected parties identified in the notes.  Therefore, I lack the necessary “detailed and convincing” evidence to establish that disclosure of any of these records could reasonably be expected to expose the Fire Department personnel who created them, or the individuals paraphrased in them, to civil liability.  Accordingly, I find that Records 239, 298-299, 309, 312 and 461-462 do not qualify for exemption under section 8(2)(c) of the Act.

Section 8(1)(a), (b) and (c)

Sections 8(1)(a), (b), and (c) of the Act read as follows.

A head may refuse to disclose a record if the disclosure could reasonably be expected to,

(a)        interfere with a law enforcement matter;

(b)        interfere with an investigation undertaken with a view to a law enforcement proceeding or from which a law enforcement proceeding is likely to result;

(c)        reveal investigative techniques and procedures currently in use or likely to be used in law enforcement;

The City claims these exemptions for Record 194.  It is a note to file by Fire Department personnel regarding a conversation with staff of the Fire Safety Commission. 

The purpose of the sections 8(1)(a) and (b) exemptions is to provide the City with the discretion to deny access to records in circumstances where their disclosure could reasonably be expected to interfere with an ongoing law enforcement investigation.  The City bears the onus of providing evidence to substantiate that, first, a law enforcement investigation is ongoing, and second, that disclosure of the records could reasonably be expected to interfere with the investigation (Orders P-324, P-403 and M-1067).

In Interim Order MO-1337-I, I determined that the Fire Department investigation of the property had been completed for some time, and that no law enforcement activities remained “ongoing”.  For this reason, I find that Record 194 does not qualify for exemption under sections 8(1)(a) or (b) of the Act.

In order to qualify for exemption under section 8(1)(c), the City must provided detailed and convincing evidence that public awareness of the particular technique or procedure reflected in Record 194 would hinder or compromise its effective utilization  (Orders P-170, M-761 and P-963).  The City has failed to do so.  The content of the discussion between the two individuals reflected in Record 194 is particular to the case involving the property.  It is factual in nature, and does not deal with an investigative technique or procedure currently used in law enforcement.  Therefore, I find that Record 194 does not qualify for exemption under section 8(1)(c) of the Act.

ADVICE OR RECOMMENDATIONS

Section 7(1) of the Act provides:

A head may refuse to disclose a record if the disclosure would reveal advice or recommendations of an officer or employee of an institution or a consultant retained by an institution.

This exemption purports to protect the free flow of advice and recommendations within the deliberative process of government decision-making or policy-making (Orders 94 and M-847).

“Advice” for the purposes of section 7(1) must contain more than mere information.  Generally speaking, advice pertains to the submission of a suggested course of action which will ultimately be accepted or rejected by its recipient during the deliberative process.  “Recommendations” are to be viewed in the same vein.  (Orders 118, P-348, P-363 (upheld on judicial review in Ontario (Human Rights Commission) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner) (March 25, 1994), Toronto Doc. 721/92 (Ont. Div. Ct.), P-883 (upheld on judicial review in Ontario (Minister of Consumer and Commercial Relations) v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner) (December 21, 1995), Toronto Doc. 220/95 (Ont. Div. Ct.), leave to appeal refused [1996] O.J. No. 1838 (C.A.)).

Information in records which would reveal the advice or recommendations is also exempt from disclosure under section 7(1) of the Act. 

I divided the records into three groups based on type.

Letters - Records 578-579, 596-598, 759-765, 1284-1285, 2170-2172, 2434-2438, 2646-2652 and 3005-3005A.

Records 759-765 and 1284-1285 are letters written by the affected parties and the affected persons to Fire Department personnel, not by City or Fire Department staff.  These records do not contain or reflect any advice or recommendations provided by officers or employees of the City or consultants retained by the City or Fire Department.  Accordingly, I find that these records are not exempt from disclosure under section 7(1) of the Act.

Records 578-579, 596-598, 2170-2172, 2434-2438, 2646-2652 and 3005-3005A are all letters authored by a City lawyer or Fire Department personnel and sent to an affected person.  These records discuss various issues regarding the property.  The recipient of these letters is not an individual who is part of the City’s deliberative process, and the records fail to qualify for exemption under section 7(1) on this basis alone.  The letters also are informational in nature, and do not suggest any course of action to be accepted or rejected.  Accordingly, I find that these records do not qualify for exemption under section 7(1) of the Act.

Notes to File - Records 191-192, 194, 372-373, 440, 1596-1598 and 2657-2661.

These records are all handwritten notes to file prepared by Fire Department personnel.

Records 191-192 is a note regarding a meeting between Fire Department personnel and an affected person concerning the sale of goods.  The note consists of various tasks that are to be undertaken, and contains nothing resembling advice or recommendations.  Therefore, I find that Records 190-191 do not qualify for exemption under section 7(1).

The remaining records are all notes documenting conversations between Fire Department personnel and certain affected parties and affected persons.  Once again, these records simply reflect these discussions, and do not contain any advice or recommendations, nor is there anything before me to suggest that these notes were to be used in order to obtain advice or recommendations.  Accordingly, I find that Records 194, 372-373, 440, 1596-1598 and 2657-2661 do not qualify for exemption under section 7(1) of the Act.

Other Records - Records 1286-1287, 1411-1413, 1415-1418, 2216, 2242 and 2800.

Records 1286-1287 contain information relating to a request for proposal process relating to the property.  The records are prepared by Fire Department personnel and include a review of the various proposals, a comparison of the bids submitted by the various affected parties, and a recommendation stating which affected party should be selected for the contract.  I find that these records contain a suggested course of action to be accepted or rejected in the deliberative process, and therefore qualify for exemption under section 7(1) of the Act.  In this case, any factual information contained in Records 1286-1287 that should be disclosed under section 7(2)(a) is so intertwined with the advice and recommendation that it is not possible to disclose the factual material without also disclosing the exempt material (Order P-920).

Records 1411-1413 and 1415-1418 consists of a contract and a draft contract between the City and an affected party.  There is nothing in either of these records to indicate that they contain advice or recommendations or that advice or recommendations were sought regarding the document.  The fact that Records 1415-1418 is a draft does not automatically mean that it constitutes advice or recommendations.  In order to qualify under section 7(1), the record must contain a recommendation of a suggested course of action that will ultimately be accepted or rejected during the deliberative process, and no such information is evident on the face of Records 1415-1418.  Therefore, I find that Records 1411-1413 and 1415-1418 do not qualify for exemption under section 7(1).

Records 2216 and 2242 are e-mails between City and Fire Department personnel regarding a media request for information.  These records involve an exchange of information, and do not contain information that relates to a suggested course of action which will ultimately be accepted or rejected by the recipient during the deliberative process.  Therefore, Records 2216 and 2242 do not qualify for exemption under section 7(1). 

Finally, Record 2800 is a draft Fire Marshal Order.  It does not contain any advice or recommendations and does not qualify for exemption under section 7(1) of the Act.

By way of summary, I find that only Records 1286-1287 qualify for exemption under section 7(1) of the Act, and the following records, which do not qualify for any other exemption claims, should be disclosed to the appellant:

Records 191-192, 194, 372-373, 440, 578-579, 596-598, 759-765, 1284-1285, 1411-1413, 1415-1418, 1596-1598, 2170-2172, 2216, 2242, 2434-2438, 2646-2652, 2657-2661, 2800 and 3005-3005A

FINAL ORDER:

1.                  I uphold the City’s decision to deny access to the following records:

Records 490‑495, 746‑749, 2460‑2462, 2591‑2604 and 1286‑1287

2.                  I order the City to disclose the following records to the appellant by January 8, 2001 but not before January 3, 2001.

Records 163, 165, 170, 183‑184, 186, 191‑192, 194, 195, 197‑198, 209, 216‑217, 221, 231, 232‑233, 234, 237‑238, 239, 264‑265, 267, 278‑279, 283, 284, 285, 290, 293‑294, 295, 298‑299, 303, 305‑308, 309, 312, 313‑314, 316‑317, 320, 322, 323‑324, 326, 328‑329, 330‑331, 332‑333, 338, 339‑340, 342, 345, 353, 354, 355, 359, 371, 372‑373, 390‑391, 419‑421, 425‑426, 430, 440, 442, 456, 457‑458, 459‑460, 461‑462, 469, 470‑471, 475‑480, 481‑482, 483, 485‑489, 496‑504, 507‑508, 509‑510, 512, 513‑514, 517‑518, 519, 522, 523‑524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 542, 543‑544, 545, 577, 578‑579, 580, 581, 582, 583‑584, 585‑588, 591‑592, 593, 596‑598, 599‑601, 605‑607, 609, 611‑612, 617, 618‑619, 620, 621‑628, 629, 630‑635, 638, 639‑644, 645‑654, 655‑664, 665‑666, 667‑669, 673‑682, 683, 684, 685, 686‑687, 688‑689, 694‑695, 696‑698, 699‑701, 702‑708, 709‑710, 716, 717‑721, 723‑724, 725‑728, 730‑732, 733, 737‑740, 741‑745, 750‑751, 752‑753, 754‑758, 759‑765, 766‑768, 775‑776, 777‑779, 781‑782, 784, 785‑791, 792‑794, 798, 799‑800, 801‑804, 805‑808, 809‑811, 812, 817‑819, 825‑829, 830‑831, 832‑833, 842‑844, 852‑860, 864, 867‑869, 870‑872, 873‑885, 886‑897, 1216‑1218, 1219, 1220‑1228, 1229‑1231, 1232, 1233‑1237, 1238‑1240, 1241, 1242‑1246, 1247‑1249, 1250, 1251‑1255, 1256‑1260, 1263‑1264, 1284‑1285, 1311, 1324‑1325, 1344‑1345, 1358‑1359,  1406‑1410, 1411‑1413, 1415‑1418, 1422‑1423,  1445‑1446, 1449, 1452, 1454‑1455, 1456‑1458, 1463, 1464‑1465, 1466‑1467, 1469‑1477, 1490‑1491, 1510, 1525, 1526‑1532, 1533‑1535, 1536‑1538, 1539‑1540, 1541‑1542, 1543‑1564, 1565‑1569, 1570‑1574, 1580‑1581, 1582, 1585, 1586‑1588, 1590, 1596‑1598, 1599‑1601, 1602‑1607, 1608‑1614, 1615‑1616, 1617‑1626, 1627, 1628, 1629‑1630, 1633, 1647, 1659‑1661, 1678‑1680, 1681‑1687, 1692‑1698, 1703‑1709, 1726‑1727, 1737‑1740, 1741‑1744, 1752‑1753, 1788, 1793‑1795, 1796‑1797, 1825, 1826, 1827‑1828, 1833‑1834, 1931, 1938‑1942, 2152, 2167, 2170‑2172, 2197‑2198, 2216, 2242, 2247, 2383, 2384‑2386, 2392, 2393‑2395, 2396‑2398, 2401‑2405, 2406‑2414, 2417‑2418, 2422‑2423, 2429‑2433, 2434‑2438, 2444‑2445, 2463‑2466, 2468‑2487, 2521‑2523, 2524‑2529, 2532‑2534, 2548‑2549, 2551, 2552‑2554, 2560‑2561, 2562‑2563, 2566‑2570, 2576‑2577, 2587‑2589, 2606‑2614, 2616‑2619, 2636, 2645, 2646‑2652, 2655, 2657‑2661, 2664‑2666, 2667, 2674, 2676‑2677, 2681‑2683, 2684‑2688, 2723‑2726, 2747‑2750, 2756‑2760, 2764, 2782, 2800, 2805, 2841‑2869, 2877, 2879‑2901, 2905‑2906, 2907, 2909‑2911, 2913‑2915, 2924‑2928, 2964‑3004, 3005‑3005A, 3009‑3016, 3018‑3020, 3021‑3027, 3028‑3030, 3031‑3034, 3035‑3036, 3037, 3038, 3045‑3046, 3051‑3055, 3056‑3063, 3065‑3066, 3085‑3087, 3103‑3104, 3216‑3221, 3222‑3224, 3225‑3237, 3238‑3244, 3259‑3262, 3264‑3270, 3271‑3274, 3321‑3323, 3326‑3328, 3329‑3330, 3343, 3353, 3392‑3393, 3394‑3396, 3407‑3409, 3417, 3418, 3422, 3423‑3425, 3426, 3431, 3433‑3434, 3436‑3439, 3440‑3446, 3448

Original signed by:                                                                          November 30, 2000                      Tom Mitchinson

Assistant Commissioner

Appendix B to Final Order MO-1373-F