Access to Information Orders
Decision Information
The requester (now the appellant) made a request under the
Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act) to the Timmins Police Services Board (the Police) for access to an e-mail or fax and all reports pertaining to a robbery at a pizzeria.
Initially, the Police issued a decision denying access to the record on the basis of section 8 (law enforcement) of the
Act. The appellant appealed this decision. Subsequent to the filing of the appeal, and during mediation, the Police identified additional records responsive to the request.
The Police then issued a supplementary decision denying access to the records in their entirety on the basis of section 38(b) (discretion to refuse requester’s own information) in conjunction with section 14 (personal privacy) in addition to section 8. There are five distinct records at issue in this appeal: an e-mail; a general occurrence report; and, three separate supplementary reports.
Mediation was unsuccessful in resolving the issues in dispute. The matter proceeded to the inquiry stage.
Decision Content
NATURE OF THE APPEAL:
The requester (now the appellant) made a request under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (the Act) to the Timmins Police Services Board (the Police) for access to an e-mail or fax and all reports pertaining to a robbery at a pizzeria.
Initially, the Police issued a decision denying access to the record on the basis of section 8 (law enforcement) of the Act. The appellant appealed this decision. Subsequent to the filing of the appeal, and during mediation, the Police identified additional records responsive to the request. The Police then issued a supplementary decision denying access to the records in their entirety on the basis of section 38(b) (discretion to refuse requester’s own information) in conjunction with section 14 (personal privacy) in addition to section 8. There are five distinct records at issue in this appeal: an e-mail; a general occurrence report; and, three separate supplementary reports.
Mediation was unsuccessful in resolving the issues in dispute. The matter proceeded to the inquiry stage.
I sought and received representations from the Police. The non-confidential portions of the Police’s representations were shared with the appellant. The appellant provided very brief representations in response.
CONCLUSION:
The e-mail contains the personal information of the appellant and also of other individuals, and is exempt under section 38(b) of the Act. The general occurrence and supplementary reports contain the personal information of other individuals only, and these records are exempt under section 8.
DISCUSSION:
PERSONAL INFORMATION
In order to assess the application of the claimed exemptions, I must first determine whether or not the records contain personal information and, if so, to whom that information relates. The term “personal information” is defined in section 2(1) of the Act, in part, as recorded information about an identifiable individual, including any identifying number assigned to the individual and the individual’s name where it appears with other personal information relating to the individual or where the disclosure of the name would reveal other personal information about the individual.
Having examined the records before me, I find that the e-mail contains the personal information of the appellant and another identifiable individual. The information includes the names and addresses of these individuals, as well as views or opinions of one individual about the other individual [paragraph (g) of the section 2(1) definition]. Hence, the information meets the requirements for “personal information”.
The other four records contain the personal information of individuals other than the appellant including their name, age, sex and address. As such, the information meets the requirements for personal information as described in paragraphs (a) and (d) of the definition.
As at least one of the records contains the personal information of the appellant, section 36(1) of the Act is applicable to this appeal. Section 36(1) of the Act gives individuals a general right of access to their own personal information held by an institution. Section 38 provides a number of exceptions to this general right of access. Under section 38(a), an individual can be denied access to their own personal information in instances where the exemption in section 8, among others, would apply to the disclosure of that information. Under section 38(b) of the Act, where a record contains the personal information of both the requester and other individuals and an institution determines that the disclosure of the information would constitute an unjustified invasion of another individual's personal privacy, the institution has the discretion to deny the requester access to that information.
In the circumstances of this appeal, the Police relied upon sections 8, 14, and 38(b) to deny access to the records at issue. While I indicated in the Notice of Inquiry delivered to the Police that the application of section 38(a) was also potentially at issue, I received no representations in that regard from the Police. Indeed, it appears from the representations from the Police that sections 8 and 14(3)(b), exclusive of section 38, were applied to the latter four records - the occurrence report and the supplementary reports - as they contained no personal information of the appellant. On the other hand, section 38(b) was applied to the e-mail record because that record contains the personal information of the appellant and another identifiable individual.
INVASION OF PRIVACY
Introduction
As indicated, I have found that the e-mail record contains the personal information of both the appellant and another identifiable individual; therefore, section 38(b) is the appropriate section to consider for this record.
In relation to the remaining four records, however, which contain only the personal information of individuals other than the appellant, section 38(b) does not apply.
Where section 38(b) applies, sections 14(2), (3) and (4) of the Act provide guidance in determining whether disclosure of personal information would result in an unjustified invasion of the personal privacy of the individual to whom the information relates. Section 14(2) provides some criteria for the institution to consider in making this determination. Section 14(3) lists the types of information whose disclosure is presumed to constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy. Section 14(4) refers to certain types of information whose disclosure does not constitute an unjustified invasion of personal privacy.
With reference to section 14(3), the Divisional Court has stated that once a presumption against disclosure has been established, it cannot be rebutted by either one or a combination of the factors set out in 14(2) [John Doe v. Ontario (Information and Privacy Commissioner) (1993), 13 O.R. (3d) 767].
Sections 38(b) and 14
Representations
The Police made confidential representations in this regard. My summary of these representations, as disclosed to the appellant, was as follows:
I applied section 38(b) to deny access to the e-mail document. The author of the e-mail document supplied the information in confidence and with the expectation that the author’s identity would not be disclosed.
Without having made explicit reference to the specific provisions of section 14, it is nevertheless clear to me that the Police denied access to the e-mail because to disclose the e-mail would constitute an unjustified invasion of the personal privacy of the author of the e-mail. The Police appear to have considered that the personal information is highly sensitive and that the author supplied their personal information in confidence. These criteria, among others, are enumerated in section 14(2) of the Act at paragraphs (f) and (h).
For his part, the appellant only had this to say in respect to the substantive issues in the appeal:
I know the names of the person who sent the false fax/e-mail [a named individual] and signed [an identified individual’s] name to it. I would like these reports to use in my defense in a court case to show someone as to having malicious intent towards me.
It appears to me that the appellant’s representations raise the possible relevance of paragraph (d) of section 14(2) in that it is the appellant’s view that disclosure of the personal information is relevant to a fair determination of his rights.