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Date: 20130313

Docket: A-295-12

Citation: 2013 FCA 78

 

CORAM:       SHARLOW J.A.

                        DAWSON J.A.

                        TRUDEL J.A.

 

BETWEEN:

Vlasta STUBICAR

Appellant

and

DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY

AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

 

Respondents

 

 

 

Heard at Ottawa, Ontario, on March 13, 2013.

Judgment delivered from the Bench at Ottawa, Ontario, on March 13, 2013.

 

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT BY:                                            DAWSON J.A.

 



Date: 20130313

Docket: A-295-12

Citation: 2013 FCA 78

 

CORAM:       SHARLOW J.A.

                        DAWSON J.A.

                        TRUDEL J.A.

 

BETWEEN:

Vlasta STUBICAR

Appellant

and

DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF PUBLIC SAFETY

AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

 

Respondents

 

 

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

(Delivered from the Bench at Ottawa, Ontario, on March 13, 2013)

DAWSON J.A.

[1]               This is an appeal from an interlocutory order rendered by the Chief Justice of the Federal Court in which he dismissed with costs a motion brought by the appellant for an order:

 

i)                    rescinding a prior order (Case Management Order) which required the underlying application to continue as a specially managed proceeding and which designated Prothonotary Morneau as the case management judge; or, in the alternative,

ii)                  varying the Case Management Order by designating a case management judge other than Prothonotary Morneau.

 

[2]               For the following reasons, we are all of the view that the appeal lacks merit and should be dismissed.

 

[3]               First, the order appealed from was discretionary and as such is entitled to deference. The appellant has not demonstrated any error of fact or law, or resulting injustice that would justify interference with the Chief Justice’s exercise of discretion.

 

[4]               Second, the appellant has not demonstrated any error of fact or law in the Chief Justice’s conclusion that the appellant failed to demonstrate any real or perceived bias on the part of Prothonotary Morneau. As we understand Chief Justice Crampton’s reasons, he concluded that the fact the Prothonotary adopted his own prior legal analysis on a narrow legal point by reiterating it without attribution did not give rise to any reasonable apprehension of bias. We agree.

 

[5]               Finally, the Chief Justice’s order with respect to costs was discretionary, based on his conclusion that the appellant’s motion should not have been brought. This was a finding open to the Chief Justice on the record before him and, again, no basis has been established on which to interfere with that exercise of discretion.

 

 

 

[6]               Therefore, the appeal will be dismissed with costs fixed at $1,040.00 inclusive of all disbursements and tax.

 

 

 

 

“Eleanor R. Dawson”

J.A.

 


FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL

 

NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD

 

 

 

DOCKET:                                                                             A-295-12

 

 

STYLE OF CAUSE:                                                            Vlasta STUBICAR v.

                                                                                                Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness

 

 

PLACE OF HEARING:                                                      Ottawa, Ontario

 

 

DATE OF HEARING:                                                        March 13, 2013

 

 

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT BY:   (SHARLOW, DAWSON, TRUDEL JJ.A.)

 

DELIVERED FROM THE BENCH BY:                         DAWSON J.A.

 

 

APPEARANCES:

 

Self-represented

FOR THE APPELLANT

 

Jacques Mimar

FOR THE RESPONDENT

 

 

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

 

William F. Pentney

Deputy Attorney General of Canada

FOR THE RESPONDENT

 

 

 

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