Federal Court of Appeal Decisions

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Date: 20051212

Docket: A-171-05

Citation: 2005 FCA 413

 

CORAM:       NOËL J.A.

                        NADON J.A.

                        PELLETIER J.A.

 

BETWEEN:

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

Appellant

and

PUBLIC SERVICE ALLIANCE OF CANADA

Respondent

 

 

 

Hearing held at Ottawa, Ontario, on December 6, 2005.

Judgment rendered at Ottawa, Ontario, on December 12, 2005.

 

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT:                                                                                        NOËL J.A.

CONCURRED IN BY:                                                                                                NADON J.A.

                                                                                                                                PELLETIER J.A.

 

 

 

 


Date: 20051212

Docket: A-171-05

Citation: 2005 FCA 413

 

CORAM:       NOËL J.A.

                        NADON J.A.

                        PELLETIER J.A.

 

BETWEEN:

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

Appellant

and

PUBLIC SERVICE ALLIANCE OF CANADA

Respondent

 

 

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

 

NOËL J.A.

[1]               This is an appeal from a judgment of the Federal Court allowing an application for judicial review of a decision by the Canadian Human Rights Commission (the Commission) on the ground that the Commission did not observe the rules of procedural fairness.

[2]               More specifically, the Court held that the Commission had not given sufficient reasons for its decision, and thus had not complied with subsection 42(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6 (the Act):

42. (1) Subject to subsection (2), when the Commission decides not to deal with a complaint, it shall send a written notice of its decision to the complainant setting out the reason for its decision.

42. (1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (2), la Commission motive par écrit sa décision auprès du plaignant dans les cas où elle décide que la plainte est irrecevable.

 

Facts

[3]               In July 1992, Revenue Canada (now the Canada Revenue Agency and the Canada Border Services Agency) transferred to the Government of Quebec a group of employees belonging to the clerical and regulatory employee professional group (CR).  On July 29, 1998, six years after these employees were transferred, a tribunal established pursuant to the Act found that the salary of employees in the CR group, including the employees transferred in 1992, was discriminatory.

[4]               On May 9, 2003, the Public Service Alliance of Canada (the respondent) filed a complaint with the Commission alleging that the agreements concluded by the Treasury Board governing the transfer of federal employees to the provincial government were in violation of sections 7 and 10 of the Act.  The respondent submitted that the effect of the agreements was to perpetuate salary discrimination against the transferred employees and nullify the right of those employees to benefit from the relief granted in the decision rendered by the tribunal in July 1998.

 

[5]               The respondent’s complaint was filed with the Commission more than four years after the tribunal’s decision.  No explanation was given.  The respondent simply said:

 

[translation]

The above complaints concern the discriminatory effect of the transfer of federal Public Service employees to provincial institutions . . . Recently, we learned of similar situations involving employees transferred from Revenue Canada to the Government of Quebec.  In our view, the situation of those employees should be assessed in the light of the investigation of the outstanding complaints . . . We know that this new complaint deals with certain events which go back several years.  Nevertheless, this new complaint is identical in nature to the outstanding complaints and there is nothing to justify excluding the complaint from the ongoing investigation.  (Investigation Report, Appeal Book, p. 25.)

 

 

 

[6]               After analysis, the Commission investigator came to the conclusion that the respondent had not provided any good reason for its delay in filing its complaint.  In his investigation report, he recommended that the Commission not rule on the complaint pursuant to paragraph 41(1)(e) of the Act, as the complaint was based on facts which had occurred more than a year before it was filed with the Commission.

 

[7]               The parties had an opportunity to comment on the Commission investigator’s report.  The parties’ comments and the investigator’s report had been submitted to the Commission when it rendered its decision on the respondent’s complaint.

 

[8]               On May 3, 2004, the Commission dismissed the complaint on the ground that it was not to deal with it under paragraph 41(1)(e) of the Act.  The Commission’s decision reads as follows:

 

Before rendering their decision, the members of the Commission reviewed the report disclosed to you previously and any submission(s) filed in response to the report. After examining this information, the Commission decided not to deal with the complaint because: it pertains to acts which occurred more than one year before the complaint was filed.

 

 

[9]               On March 23, 2005, the Federal Court allowed the application for judicial review of this decision on the ground that the Commission had failed to comply with the principle of procedural fairness as it had not given sufficient reasons for its decision.

[10]           That is the judgment a quo.

Analysis and decision

[11]           In my view, the trial judge wrongly held that the Commission’s decision was not supported by sufficient reasons to meet the requirements of subsection 42(1) of the Act.

[12]           It is true that in Kidd v. Greater Toronto Airport Authority, [2004] F.C.J. No. 859 (affirmed on appeal, Kidd v. Greater Toronto Airport Authority, [2005] F.C.A. 81), it was held that the Commission had to do more than paraphrase the Act in order to meet its duty to set out its reasons.  However, as the trial judge noted, that was a case in which the Commission had refused to follow the investigator’s recommendation.

[13]           In the case at bar, the Commission noted that it had reviewed the investigator’s report and disposed of the matter in accordance with his recommendation.  It has already been held several times that, in so doing, the Commission approves and adopts the reasons relied on by the investigator (S.E.P.Q.A. v. Canada (C.H.R.C.), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 879, at page 899; Bell Canada v.  Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, [1999] 1 F.C. 11, at paragraph 30;

Candu (Minister of National Revenue) v. Gee, (2002) F.C.A. 4, at paragraph 15; Hardman v. Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., [1997] F.C.J. No. 477, at paragraph 13).

[14]           The trial judge distinguished these cases.  She appears to have been of the view that the reasons given by the investigator were sufficient in themselves to explain the dismissal of the complaint, but she questioned the fact that the Commission had approved them.  In her view, [translation] “The fact that the Commission read the investigator’s report does not mean the Commission endorsed it” (reasons, paragraph 11).  With respect, that is an error of law.

[15]           Assuming arguendo that the wording of the reasons gave rise to the ambiguity mentioned by the trial judge, namely as to whether the Commission had approved the investigator’s reasons, the decision must be interpreted so as to validate the reasons, not so as to make them illegal.

[16]           In the case at bar, it may be infered that, by adopting the investigator’s recommendation, after indicating that it had reviewed his report, the Commission approved the reasons given by the investigator.  This reading is the only legitimate one in the light of the case law, which has approved this approach for a great many years.

[17]           The duty of the Commission to set out reasons for its decision involves explaining to the complainant why his or her complaint will not be dealt with.  When such explanations are confined to the investigation report, the Commission by affirming them, enables the complainant to see why the complaint was dismissed.  Further, the respondent cannot seriously contend that it did not know precisely why its complaint was dismissed.

 

[18]           For these reasons, I would allow the appeal with costs, set aside the judgment of the Federal Court and, in accordance with the judgment that should have been rendered, I would dismiss the application for judicial review with costs.

 

 

“Marc Noël”

J.A.

 

 

 

 

I concur.

            M. Nadon J.A.

 

I concur.

            J.D.Denis Pelletier J.A.

 

 

 

 

 

Certified true translation

François Brunet, LLB, BCL

 

 

 


FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL

 

SOLICITORS OF RECORD

 

 

DOCKET:                                                      A-171-05

 

Appeal from order by the Honourable Madam Justice Tremblay-Lamer, dated March 23, 2005, in docket T-1097-04

 

STYLE OF CAUSE:                                      ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA v. PUBLIC SERVICE ALLIANCE OF CANADA

 

 

PLACE OF HEARING:                                Ottawa

 

DATE OF HEARING:                                  December 6, 2005

 

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT BY:                         Noël J.A.

 

CONCURRED IN BY:                                 Nadon J.A.

                                                                        Pelletier J.A.

 

DATED:                                                         December 12, 2005

 

 

APPEARANCES:

 

Jan Brongers                                                    FOR THE APPELLANT

 

James Cameron                                                FOR THE RESPONDENT

 

 

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

 

John, Sims                                                        FOR THE APPELLANT

Deputy Attorney General of Canada

Ottawa, Ontario

                       

Raven, Allen                                                     FOR THE RESPONDENT

Cameron, Ballantyne & Yazbeck

Ottawa, Ontario

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