Federal Court of Appeal Decisions

Decision Information

Decision Content

Date: 20021018

Docket: A-355-00

Neutral citation: 2002 FCA 397

BETWEEN:

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

and

THE MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE CANADA

Appellants

-and-

WADACERF INTERNATIONAL INC.

Respondent

ASSESSMENT OF COSTS - REASONS

FRANÇOIS PILON

Assessment Officer

[1]        This action was allowed with costs on December 18, 2001. On August 23, 2002, Dominique Guimond, counsel for the Department of Justice, filed the appellants' bill of costs and asked that it be assessed without a personal appearance by the parties. On September 20, 2002, Luc Huppé, counsel for the respondent, filed his written submissions against the bill of costs.


[2]        Mr. Huppé asked that the bill of costs be dismissed for the following three reasons:

            (a) the appellants' bill was not consistent with the Tariff, since it indicated no breakdown for the monies claimed and provided no documentation or explanation in support of the claim;

            (b) the affidavit accompanying the bill was signed by an articling student, who did not take any part in the case and who therefore had no adequate personal knowledge of the content of the claim; and

            (c) the total amount claimed was in no way reasonable, being contrary to the clearly established rule in the Tariff.

[3]        To begin with, Mr. Guimond did not have to give further particulars of the amounts claimed in items 17, 18, 19, 20 and 22(a), as those items reflected each stage of the procedure in the case, resulting in recovery of costs under assessable services. A party who has his costs assessed is entitled to do this without providing further particulars. At the assessment the assessment officer decides on the legality of each item claimed, depending on whether it is consistent with the provisions of Tariffs A and B. At the same time, I agree with Mr. Huppé's argument that documentation may be required in the event that a party has to justify certain costs. We will return to this below.


[4]        As to the second objection, it seems quite acceptable to me for an articling student to become familiar with a case at the time the bill of costs is prepared. In my opinion, it will be sufficient to have a good knowledge of all aspects of Tariff B as they apply to the various stages of the proceeding in a particular case. The fact that an articling student has not earlier participated in the hearing of the case does not in any way diminish the validity of his or her affidavit in support of the bill of costs.

[5]        Finally, Mr. Huppé argued that the total amount claimed was not reasonable and contravened the clearly established rule in the Tariff. I do not agree with this allegation, because it is general in scope. With respect, I note that counsel was free to submit arguments in opposition to specific items in the bill of costs if he objected to the number of units requested by the defendants, with reference to the factors listed in paragraph 3 of Rule 400. However, that was not the case. In the circumstances, I will not reduce the amount sought for the assessable services, since each item is consistent with column III of Tariff B.

[6]        As to item 26, for assessment of costs, I will reduce this claim from 6 to 3 units, since the assessment took place without a personal appearance by counsel.


Disbursements

[7]        The defendant submitted the sum of $1,281 for photocopies, at $0.25 a page. Here I will rule in favour of Mr. Huppé, who had earlier objected to the absence of documentation. I do not doubt that these photocopies were made and that they were probably necessary for the conduct of the appeal: the documents included in the Court record appear to establish this. However, what we need is evidence of the actual cost of this disbursement. The affidavit in support of the bill of costs is defective in this regard: it does not mention the photocopying costs. Further, we do not know whether these were incurred in counsel's office or at the premises of an independent supplier. I wondered how this expense was incurred and paid. The evidence does not provide an answer. In these circumstances, I must disallow this claim.

[8]        The sum of $973.59 was submitted for payment for transcripts, with supporting voucher. This amount should have appeared in the bill of costs in the related case at trial (T-2990-92). However, for reasons of efficiency and simplicity I will allow this item here as the parties and counsel are clearly the same.

[9]        The sum of $143.75 for attendance by a stenographer at a hearing of over three days is disallowed, as that expense results from the trial record and has already been awarded. The sum of $36.38 for costs of service is allowed, since these costs were supported by vouchers attached to the affidavit.


[10]      The appellants' costs are assessed and allowed in the amount of $3,149.47.

"François Pilon"

line

Assessment Officer

Halifax, Nova Scotia

October 18, 2002

Certified true translation

Suzanne M. Gauthier, C. Tr., LL.L.


                                                    FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL

                              NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD

COURT FILE No.:                                                         A-355-00

BETWEEN:                                                                     HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN ET AL.

Appellants

-and-

WADACERF INTERNATIONAL INC.

Respondent

ASSESSMENT IN WRITING WITHOUT PERSONAL APPEARANCE

REASONS BY:                                                              François Pilon, Assessment Officer

PLACE OF ASSESSMENT:                                        Halifax, Nova Scotia

DATE OF REASONS:                                                  October 18, 2002

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

Morris Rosenberg                                                                                       for the appellants

Deputy Attorney General of Canada

de Grandpré, Chaurette, Lévesque                                                          for the respondent

Montréal, Quebec

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