Federal Court of Appeal Decisions

Decision Information

Decision Content

     Date: 19980121

     Docket: A-622-95

QUÉBEC, QUEBEC, THIS 21st DAY OF JANUARY 1998

Coram:      THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE PRATTE

         THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DENAULT

         THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DÉCARY

Between:

     TRANSPORT LOUPAGE INC.,

     Appellant,

     -and-

     NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION AGENCY OF CANADA,

     Respondent.

     JUDGMENT

     The appeal is dismissed.

     Louis Pratte

     J.A.

Certified true translation

C. Delon, LL.L.


     Date: 19980121

     Docket: A-622-95

CORAM:      PRATTE J.A.

         DENAULT J.A.

         DÉCARY J.A.

Between:

     TRANSPORT LOUPAGE INC.,

     Appellant,

     -and-

     NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION AGENCY OF CANADA,

     Respondent.

Hearing held at Québec, Quebec, on Wednesday, January 21, 1998.

Judgment delivered from the bench on Wednesday, January 21, 1998.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT BY:      PRATTE J.A.

     Date: 19980121

     Docket: A-622-95

CORAM:      PRATTE J.A.

         DENAULT J.A.

         DÉCARY J.A.

BETWEEN:

     TRANSPORT LOUPAGE INC.,

     Appellant,

     -and-

     NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION AGENCY OF CANADA,

     Respondent.

     REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

     (Delivered from the bench at Québec, Quebec,

     on Wednesday, January 21, 1998)

PRATTE J.A.

[1]      This is an appeal from a decision of the National Transportation Agency rescinding the decisions it had made earlier and declaring that the appellant was not entitled to certain assistance that it had been awarded and paid under the Atlantic Regional Special Selective and Provisional Assistance Regulations, SOR/78-495.

[2]      The Board had approved the payment of this assistance because it had assumed that the assistance was claimed by the appellant for transportation that was not "ineligible movements" within the meaning of paragraph 2(2)(h) of the Regulations. More precisely, the Agency believed that these were not

     the movement of goods that are the property of a carrier or of the sole owner or the controller of a carrier;        

[3]      After the appellant received this assistance, the Agency discovered facts which, in its opinion, made the movements for which the assistance had been paid ineligible. For that reason, the Agency concluded that assistance had been paid to which the appellant was not entitled.

[4]      The appellant's main argument, and the only one that merits discussion, is that the new facts discovered by the Agency did not allow it to conclude that the movements for which assistance had been paid were ineligible within the meaning of paragraph 2(2)(h).

[5]      This new evidence established that the appellant was a transport company controlled by the corporation Gestion J.P. Lepage inc. which, in addition to holding all of the shares of the appellant, also held all of the voting shares of Alphonse Lepage inc., the shipper and owner of the goods transported. The Agency deduced from this that the while goods transported by the appellant were owned by the shipper, Alphonse Lepage inc., they in fact were indirectly the property of Gestion J.P. Lepage inc. and that because of this the movements were ineligible as described in paragraph 2(2)(h).

[6]      It is this conclusion that the appellant is challenging. A movement is not declared to be ineligible by paragraph 2(2)(h), it says, unless the goods transported are the property either of a carrier (which is plainly not the case here) or of "the controller of a carrier". In the instant case, the appellant continues, while it is certain that Gestion J.P. Lepage controlled the carrier (i.e. the appellant), it is also certain that that corporation was not the owner of the goods transported, which were the property of the shipper, Alphonse Lepage inc. The Agency could not conclude otherwise, the appellant says, without confusing the distinct patrimonies of Alphonse Lepage inc. and Gestion J.P. Lepage inc.


[7]      If, as the appellant suggests, paragraph 2(2)(h) of the Regulations had to be interpreted having regard to the classical principles of corporate law, the objective of this paragraph of the Regulations could easily be thwarted. That objective is to ensure that the assistance provided for in the Regulations benefits public carriers, and not carriers transporting their own goods. As Heald J.A. said in R. & G. Milk Trucking Company Limited v. Motor Vehicle Transport Committee:1

     ...[T]he scheme [of the Regulations] does not contemplate assistance to a carrier in respect of transportation of his own property, whether his ownership be direct or indirect.        

[8]      In the instant case, it appears to us that the Agency was correct to conclude that while the goods transported were not directly the property of the party who controlled the carrier, nonetheless it could be said that they were indirectly its property since they were the property of a corporation of which it had complete control. The rule that a corporation has a personality distinct from its shareholders is not so absolute that it does not admit of exceptions, and an exception must be made to it when the objective of a set of regulations would be thwarted if that rule were to be applied in interpreting the regulations.

[9]      The appellant's appeal must be dismissed on the ground that the Agency properly interpreted and applied paragraph 2(2)(h) of the Regulations.

[10]      We must add that we are not interpreting the decision of the Agency as deciding that the appellant is required to repay the monies that it received to which it was not entitled. In fact, we believe, for the reasons given by Chief Justice Thurlow in R. & G. Milk Trucking Company Limited,2 that the Agency did not have jurisdiction to make an order of that nature.

     "Louis Pratte"

     J.A.

Certified true translation

C. Delon, LL.L.

     FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL

     Date: 19980121

     Docket: A-622-95

BETWEEN:

     TRANSPORT LOUPAGE INC.,

     Appellant,

     -and-

     NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION AGENCY OF CANADA,

     Respondent.

    

     REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

     OF THE COURT

    

     FEDERAL COURT OF APPEAL

     NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD

COURT FILE NO:          A-622-95

STYLE OF CAUSE:          Transport Loupage Inc. v. National Transportation Agency of Canada

PLACE OF HEARING:          Québec, Quebec

DATE OF HEARING:          January 21, 1998

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE COURT      (Pratte, Denault, Décary JJ.A.)

DELIVERED FROM THE BENCH BY:          Pratte J.A.

APPEARANCES:

Lina Beaulieu          for the applicant

Richard Laliberté

Ron Ashley          for the respondent

SOLICITORS OF RECORD:

Gagné, Letarte

Québec, Quebec          for the applicant

Legal Services

National Transportation Agency

Hull, Quebec          for the respondent

__________________

1      Unpublished decision of this Court, file no. A-994-83, dated April 27, 1984, delivered by Heald J.A., Thurlow C.J. dissenting in part.

2 Supra.

 You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.