Date: 20041015
Docket: IMM-2954-04
Citation: 2004 FC 1427
OTTAWA, ONTARIO, THIS 15TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2004
PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MADAM JUSTICE SNIDER
BETWEEN:
GASHEMEZA JACQUES NGORORANO
(a.k.a. Jacques Gasheme Ngororano)
Applicant
- and -
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
SNIDER J.
[1] The Applicant, a Tutsi citizen of Rwanda, arrived in Canada in 2001 from the United Sates. He claimed Convention refugee status and that he was a person in need of protection. He based his claim on a fear of persecution by the Interahamwe, an extremist Hutu group in Rwanda. In a decision dated March 4, 2004, a panel of the Immigration and Refugee Board, Refugee Protection Division ("Board") rejected his claim, concluding that the Applicant's account of the events that allegedly led to his claim were not credible. The Applicant seeks judicial review of that decision.
Issues
[2] This application raises one issue:
1. Did the Board err in its understanding of the Applicant's evidence or by failing to consider the totality of the Applicant's evidence?
[3] More specifically, the Applicant submits that the Board made errors in respect of the following:
1. Did the Board err in finding that the Applicant did not report the names of alleged killers to the authorities?
2. Did the Board err in rejecting the letter from his wife corroborating his claim?
3. Did the Board err by rejecting the Applicant's explanation for why he did not leave Rwanda on his own passport?
4. Did the Board err in finding that the state had offered the Applicant state protection?
Analysis
[1] I can only overturn the decision of the Board if I conclude that it was patently unreasonable, in the sense that it was entirely unsupported by the evidence. As stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Law Society of New Brunswick v. Ryan, 2003 SCC 20, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 247, at para. 52, a patently unreasonable decision is one that is clearly irrational or evidently not in accord with reason.
Names of Alleged Killers
[2] In its decision that Board stated that:
Furthermore, the panel does not find credible the claimant's statement that he was the only one to have been targeted by the Hutus, even though others also reported the names of the alleged killers of the wife of the school's principal . . . The panel finds that if others had also reported the names of the alleged killers, that on a balance of probabilities, the Hutus would equally have targeted them. The panel finds that the claimant did not report the names of the alleged killers to the authorities.
[3] The Applicant submits that he did not, in his testimony say whether those other persons who had reported the names of assailants did or did not experience problems.
[4] This paragraph of the Board's decision is not particularly clear. There was evidence that, at the time the Applicant allegedly received the threatening letter that precipitated his leaving, no one else received a letter. However, even assuming that the error alleged by the Applicant was made, I am not persuaded that this minor error is material to the decision. The conclusion that the Applicant did not report the names of the alleged killers to the authorities was not determinative of the claim. When read in its totality, the decision was based on a number of findings that the story of the Applicant lacked credibility. This minor error, if there is one, does not result in a patently unreasonable decision.
Rejection of Wife's Letter
[5] The Applicant submitted a letter from his wife in Rwanda stating that she had heard that the Interahamwe were looking for him. The Board rejected this letter, stating that it "does not give credence to this piece of information and finds that it was included to bolster this claim". The Applicant argues that the Board erred by failing to give reasons for its rejection of this letter.
[6] Given that the only reference in the letter to the risk faced by the Applicant consists of hearsay, rejection of this letter was entirely reasonable.
Passport
[7] The Board did not find credible the Applicant's explanations for not leaving Rwanda with his valid passport. This subject occupied quite a bit of time at the hearing. While the Applicant attempted to explain the situation, his testimony on this point was inconsistent. The Board did not accept his explanation. The Applicant submits that the Board's conclusion was patently unreasonable. I do not agree.
[8] Having read the reasons and the transcript discussion of this point, I am satisfied that the conclusion reached by the Board and its rejection of the Applicant's explanation was reasonablely open to it. There was no error.
Availability of State Protection
[9] The Applicant submits that the Board's conclusion of the availability of state protection is flawed; that it failed to take into account that the authorities did not investigate the threatening letter but merely advised the Applicant to be careful.
[10] An analysis of the reasons of the Board does not support this conclusion. The Board recognized that the state protection was not perfect by its reference to the police warning to the Applicant that it could not guarantee his safety. The Board then referred to the case of Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Villafranca (1992), 18 Imm. L.R. (2d) 130 (F.C.A.), where it was held that the mere fact that a state is not always successful at protecting its citizens is not enough to justify a conclusion that a victim is unable to avail themselves of state protection. The Applicant's own testimony, as referred to by the Board, was that state authorities were involved in investigating and making arrests in relation to the 1997 incident, and had continued to protect the school and civilians.
[11] The Board's analysis, although brief on this issue, demonstrates that it applied the correct test for assessing the availability of state protection. Based on the evidence before it, I am satisfied that the Board's conclusion was not patently unreasonable.
Conclusion
[12] In conclusion, the decision is not one that is clearly irrational or evidently not in accord with reason. For these reasons, the application will be dismissed. Neither party proposed a question for certification. None will be certified.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The application is dismissed; and
2. No question is certified.
"Judith A. Snider"
Judge
FEDERAL COURT
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: IMM-2954-04
STYLE OF CAUSE: GASHEMEZA JACQUES NGORORANO (a.k.a.
Jacques Gasheme Ngororano) v. THE M.C. & I.
PLACE OF HEARING: Edmonton, Alberta
DATE OF HEARING: October 13, 2004
REASONS FOR ORDER
AND ORDER: The Honourable Madam Justice Snider
DATED: October 15, 2004
APPEARANCES:
Mr. Simon K. Yu FOR APPLICANT
Mr. W. Brad Hardstaff FOR RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Barrister & Solicitor FOR APPLICANT
Edmonton, Alberta
Morris Rosenberg FOR RESPONDENT
Deputy Attorney General of Canada