Date: 19980114
Docket: IMM-803-97
Between :
Rong CAI
Applicant
- and -
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
PINARD, J. :
[1] The applicant seeks judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (the Board) dated February 3, 1997, in which the Board determined he was not a Convention refugee as defined in subsection 2(1) of the Immigration Act (the Act).
[2] The applicant essentially questions the Board"s findings of fact, the inferences drawn from these facts, as well as its finding of lack of credibility.
[3] The Board found that the applicant"s answers were vague and unclear, and also expressed serious concern with respect to the applicant"s demeanour and reactions:
| . . . The claimant"s responses were not spontaneous. He seemed to adjust his answers as questions were raised. |
[4] The Federal Court of Appeal discussed the Board"s assessment of an applicant"s demeanour in Wen v. Canada (M.E.I.) (June 10, 1994), A.-397-91, at page 2:
| That apart, we also observe that the adverse finding was based as well on the appellant"s answers being "confusing" and "evasive". This assessment of personal demeanour ought not to be interfered with by this Court which lacks the advantages available to the triers of fact. (See Clarke v. Edinburgh Tramways Co. , [1919] S.C. 35 (H.L.) quoted in Fletcher v. Manitoba Public Insurance Company (1990), 116 N.R. 1 (S.C.C.), at pages 12-13.) |
[5] From a review of the transcripts in the case at bar, it would appear to me that the applicant"s answers were somewhat vague and unclear. Given that the Board had the advantage of observing his demeanour, I am of the opinion that this Court ought not interfere with its assessment.
[6] The Board also found that the applicant"s story was not credible due to various inconsistencies, contradictions, and implausibilities. For instance, the Board pointed to: (1) the issuance of membership certificates by a secret society, and the applicant"s vague explanations with respect to the need for these certificates; (2) the applicant"s hesitation in describing his reports to Mr. Pan; (3) the applicant"s statement that the Pagong District Deity Society had no president when he had earlier stated that Mr. Wei was the president; (4) the applicant"s difficulty in explaining the secret/public nature of the society, as well as the political/religious aspects; and (5) the applicant"s confusion with respect to the date of Mr. Wei"s capture. I am unsure whether I would agree with the Board"s specific findings with regard to various elements in the applicant"s story, however that is not the standard that has been established by the jurisprudence. I am unable to conclude that the Board"s conclusions are so unreasonable as to warrant intervention by this Court. In my opinion, there was sufficient evidence upon which the Board could arrive at its conclusions.
[7] The Federal Court of Appeal held in Aguebor v. Canada (M.C.I.) (1993), 160 N.R. 315, at page 316, that the tribunal is in the best position to evaluate a claimant"s credibility:
| There is no longer any doubt that the Refugee Division, which is a specialized tribunal, has complete jurisdiction to determine the plausibility of testimony: who is in a better position than the Refugee Division to gauge the credibility of an account and to draw the necessary inferences? As long as the inferences drawn by the tribunal are not so unreasonable as to warrant our intervention, its findings are not open to judicial review. In Giron, the court merely observed that in the area of plausibility, the unreasonableness of a decision may be more palpable, and so more easily identifiable, since the account appears on the face of the record. In our opinion, Giron in no way reduces the burden that rests on an appellant, of showing that the inferences drawn by the Refugee Division could not reasonably have been drawn. In this case, the appellant has not discharged this burden. |
[8] It has also been held that a negative finding of credibility can be extended to all relevant evidence drawn from the testimony (see Sheikh v. Canada (M.E.I.) (1990), 11 Imm.L.R. (2d) 81 (F.C.A.)).
[9] For all the above reasons, the application for judicial review is dismissed.
JUDGE
OTTAWA, ONTARIO
January 14, 1998