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     Date: 19990917

     Docket: T-1113-97

B E T W E E N :

     ALAIN CHARRON

    

     Applicant

     - and -

     LE MINISTÈRE DES TRANSPORTS

    

     Respondent

     REASONS FOR ORDER

     (Delivered from the Bench at Ottawa, Ontario

     June 23, 1998)

HUGESSEN J.

     [1]      This is an application for judicial review of a decision of a three-member appeal panel of the Civil Aviation Tribunal which confirmed a decision of a single member of that Tribunal which, in turn, had upheld a decision of the Minister to suspend the applicant's licence as a pilot for a period of three days.

     [2]      The facts were stated as follows in the decision of the single member and have not been the subject of dispute:

                      On March 8, 1996, Mr. Alain Charron was the pilot-in-command of a Cessna 172 aircraft registered as C-GZTE. On this occasion, parachutists were dropped from the aircraft in controlled airspace without the necessary authorization having been obtained.                 

     [3]      The offence of which the applicant was found guilty is set out in section 515 of the Air Regulations1 as they then read, the Regulations having been changed since the date of the offence. At that time, it read, in relevant part:

515.      Parachute descents, other than emergency descents, shall not be made:

(a)      in controlled airspace or within any air route designated as such by the Minister except in accordance with the written authorization of the Minister; or

...

515.      Sauf en cas d"urgence, il ne sera pas effectué de descentes en parachute

(a)      dans les espaces aériens contrôlés, ni dans les limites des routes aériennes désignées comme telles par le ministre, si ce n"est en conformité d"une autorisation écrite du ministre; ou

...

     [4]      The responsibility of the applicant as pilot-in-command was engaged by the application of subsection 8.4(3) of the Aeronautics Act2:

8.4      (3)      The pilot-in-command of an aircraft may be proceeded against in respect of and found to have committed an offence under this Part in relation to the aircraft for which another person is subject to be proceeded against unless the offence was committed without the consent of the pilot-in-command and, where found to have committed the offence, the pilot-in-command is liable to the penalty provided as punishment therefor.

8.4      (3)      Lorsqu'une personne peut être poursuivie en raison d'une infraction à la présente partie ou à ses textes d'application relative à un aéronef, le commandant de bord de celui-ci peut être poursuivi et encourir la peine prévue, à moins que l'infraction n'ait été commise sans le consentement du commandant.

     [5]      The applicant takes three points. As I understand him, the first is that he should not be held responsible for the actions of persons who, while they had been passengers in his aircraft, were no longer so at the time they committed the offence. By definition of course, a person who is parachuting is not a passenger in an aircraft. I confess that I have some difficulty understanding the relevance of the point. The applicant is not made responsible for the actions of passengers. He is made responsible by virtue of the text of section 8.4(3) for offences committed in relation to the aircraft of which he was the pilot-in-command. Manifestly, a parachutist who commits an offence by exiting an aircraft at 4,000 feet in controlled airspace is committing an offence in relation to the aircraft from which he exits. The point, accordingly, has no merit.

     [6]      The applicant's second point, as I understand it, is that the parachutes in question are themselves "aircraft" within the definition as found in the Act3. That may or may not be so. It is not necessary for me to decide the point. It is clear, however, that whether or not a parachute is itself an aircraft, an offence which consists of making a parachute descent from an aircraft, which is the offence found in section 515 previously quoted, is an offence committed in relation to the aircraft from which the descent is made. Whether or not another aircraft, namely the parachute, is arguably involved in that offence, does not relieve the pilot-in-command of the aircraft from which the descent is made of the responsibility imposed by statute.

     [7]      The applicant's final point is that there was no evidence that the descent was made in controlled airspace. The short answer to that is that it is quite clear from the record that both before the single member and before the Appeal Tribunal, there was an admission of the facts. Before the single member, the passage which I read at the beginning of these reasons outlining the facts is immediately followed by this statement:

                      The applicant's representative told the Tribunal that the facts submitted were not in dispute.                 

     [8]      Likewise, before the Appeal Tribunal, there is a very similar passage which appears at page 2 of the Appeal Tribunal's reasons:

                      The following statement of facts was not disputed by the appellant's representative. On March 8, 1996, Mr. Alain Charron was the pilot-in-command of a Cessna 172 aircraft registered as C-GZTE when parachutists were dropped from the aircraft in controlled airspace at the airport in Gatineau, Québec, without the necessary authorization having been obtained from the Transport Canada.                 

     [9]      In the face of admissions of that sort, it is not necessary for the Tribunal to have further evidence before it. I would add, however, that it would appear from the transcript and other materials before me that there was in fact evidence upon which the Tribunal could have made a finding if those facts had been disputed. But since they were not, it was certainly no error for the Tribunal to make the finding it did.

     [10]      On the whole of the case, I would simply remind the applicant that on an application for judicial review of this sort, this Court is not called upon to review the correctness of the decision reached by the Tribunal or Tribunals below but rather its legality. Legality in this case means that the Tribunal must have acted within its jurisdiction and not have committed a patently unreasonable mistake. Here there is no question of any error of any kind and certainly not of one which is patently unreasonable.

     [11]      It follows that the application will be dismissed.

     "James K. Hugessen"

     judge

__________________

1      C.R.C. 1978, c. 2 as amended by SOR/85-1089 (repealed by subsection 900.01(a) of the Canadian Aviation Regulations , SOR/96-433, in force October, 10, 1996)

2      R.S.C. 1985, c. A-2

3      Section 3 of the Aeronautics Ac t (R.S.C. 1985, c. A-2.) reads:

"aircraft" means(a) until the day on which paragraph (b) comes into force, any machine capable of deriving support in the atmosphere from reactions of the air, and includes a rocket, and
(b) [Not in force]3(1) "
"aéronef"a) Jusqu'à l'entrée en vigueur de l'alinéa b), tout appareil qui peut se soutenir dans l'atmosphère grâce aux réactions de l'air, ainsi qu'une fusée;
b) [Non en vigueur]3(1)
 You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.