Date: 20000508
Docket: IMM-975-99
Ottawa, Ontario, May 8, 2000
| Present: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DENAULT |
Between: MIN SU CHOI,
Plaintiff,
- and -
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION,
Defendant.
ORDER
The application for judicial review is dismissed. There is no basis for certifying the question suggested by counsel for the plaintiff.
| PIERRE DENAULT Judge |
Certified true translation
Martine Brunet, LL. B.
Date: 20000508
Docket: IMM-975-99
Between: MIN SU CHOI,
Plaintiff,
- and -
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION,
Defendant.
REASONS FOR ORDER
DENAULT J.
[1] The situation in the case at bar is a highly unusual one in which the plaintiff was denied a permanent resident's visa in Canada for himself and his family in the investor category. Although he told the visa officer that since his initial visa application he had divorced his wife to allow her to collect a larger compensation from the Korean authorities for the expropriation of her real property, he maintained that he intended to remarry his spouse shortly for the purposes of their visa application. As the visa officer considered that he had reasonable grounds to believe that these facts could constitute an offence in Korea which, if committed in Canada, could also be punishable there, he found that the plaintiff belonged to an inadmissible class of immigrants and rejected his application.
[2] The plaintiff asked this Court to set aside the decision on the grounds that the visa officer, who had no specialized knowledge of Korean or Canadian criminal law, erred in deciding that on the facts the plaintiff and his wife had committed an act that would constitute an offence both under the Korean criminal code and the Canadian Criminal Code.
[3] Let us briefly review the facts. The plaintiff filed an application for permanent residence in Canada in the investor category on November 7, 1996. He was summoned to an interview scheduled for April 21, 1998 and told the visa officer that he had filed divorce proceedings against his wife so she could obtain higher financial compensation from the Korean Land Development Co. as a result of the expropriation of property registered in her name. According to the plaintiff, the couple would take the necessary steps to remarry sometime in September 1998, once the transaction was complete. The visa officer expressed some concern about the plaintiff's marital status and the reasons why he divorced his ex-wife and asked the plaintiff to update certain documents, including the Family Census Register (FCR) and the Residence Register (RR), within 90 days.
[4] On receipt of the documents requested the visa officer, in July 1998, noted certain disparities between the original of the FCR and RR and their translations.1 Intrigued by this situation, the visa officer on September 9, 1998 asked to be provided with explanations of these errors or omissions. The plaintiff and a representative of the firm of consultants which had done the translation of the documents filed sworn statements seeking to justify these omissions. Clearly, they were unable to persuade the visa officer, who considered that the erroneous translation of the FCR and the RR was designed only to alter the facts so as to facilitate inclusion of the family members in the visa application.2
[5] On February 5, 1999 the visa officer rejected the application as follows:
| Dear Mr. Choi, |
| This refers to your application for permanent residence in Canada which was filed in the Investor category. I regret to inform you that your application has been refused for the reasons which follow. |
| You and your spouse, are each members of the class of persons who are inadmissible to Canada which is described in subparagraph 19(2)a.1)(ii) of the Immigration Act in that I have reasonable grounds to believe that you have committed on or about May 1997 and/or 21 April 1998 and/or June 1998 in the Republic of Korea of "Untrue Entry in an Officially Authenticated Original Deed" contrary to Article 228 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Korea and/or "Fraud" contrary to Article 347 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Korea. My reasonable grounds for this belief are based upon statements made at your selection interview on 21 April 1998 to which you made a solemn declaration of truth, a letter from your representative dated 17 April 1998, a translated Family Census Register and Resident Register dated 16 June 1998, and a solemn affirmation made on 12 October all of which you submitted in connection with your application. I have attached a copy of subparagraph 19(2)a.1)(ii) for your reference. |
| The(se) offence(s) would be equivalent to the Canadian offence of "Fraudulent Registration of Title" contrary to Section 386 of the Canadian Criminal Code (CCC), or "Disposal of Property to Defraud Creditors" contrary to CCC Section 392, and/or "False Pretence or False Statement" contrary to Section CCC 362, or "Fraudulent Concealment" contrary to CCC Section 341. These offences may be prosecuted by indictment and each renders the offender liable to a term of imprisonment not to exceed two years except CCC Section 386 which renders the offender liable to a term of imprisonment not to exceed five years. |
. . . . .
| I have also considered other factors in your application and find no other basis for approval. |
. . . . .
[6] Section 19 of the Immigration Act states that certain individuals fall into an inadmissible class of immigrants. Section 19(2)(a.1)(ii) states the following:
| 19.(2) Appartiennent à une catégorie non admissible les immigrants et, sous réserve du paragraphe (3), les visiteurs qui: . . .
. . .
|
19.(2) No immigrant and, except as provided in subsection (3), no visitor shall be granted admission if the immigrant or visitor is a member of any of the following classes: . . .
. . .
|
[7] Essentially, the plaintiff argued first that the officer was not competent to decide whether the plaintiff had committed an act that constituted an offence in Korea as she was not competent to do so or to decide on what was equivalent under Canadian law. He further argued that in the circumstances the officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe that the plaintiff had committed an act constituting an offence.
[8] Under the Immigration Act, it is up to an immigrant seeking to reside in Canada to prove that his admission is not contrary to the Act or Regulations (s. 8.1), and it is the duty of the visa officer to issue such visas if he is satisfied that the landing of the plaintiff and his dependants would not be contrary to the Act or Regulations (s. 9(4)). The visa officer has a duty at that time to determine whether the plaintiff falls within an inadmissible class within the meaning of s. 19 of the Act. In so far as s. 19(2)(a.1)(ii) sets out the information the visa officer must take into account in deciding whether a claimant is inadmissible, clearly it is that officer, not an attorney or legal expert, who must exercise this power of determination. The same is true when a decision must be made as to the equivalence of Canadian law with the foreign law. In this regard, in Li v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),3 the Federal Court of Appeal said the following about s. 19(2)(a.1)(i):
| What must be compared are [sic] the factual and legal criteria for establishing the offence both abroad and in Canada. |
I feel the same test should be applied with respect to s. 19(2)(a.1)(ii).
[9] The standard of evidence required for a visa officer to be satisfied that reasonable grounds exist for believing that a person has committed an act that constitutes an offence in the country where it was committed and in Canada is a bona fide belief in a serious possibility based on credible evidence. In Chiau v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),4 Dubé J. wrote the following:
| The standard of proof required to establish "reasonable grounds" is more than a flimsy suspicion, but less than the civil test of balance of probabilities. [Cf. Ramirez v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 2 F.C. 306 (C.A.); Sivakumar v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C. (C.A.); and Al Yamani, supra, note 7, at pp. 215-217]. And, of course, a much lower threshold than the criminal standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt". It is a bona fide belief in a serious possibility based on credible evidence. |
[10] The plaintiff argued that in the circumstances of the case at bar the officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe that such an offence had been committed and that he erred in referring to ss. 228 and 347 of the Korean criminal code and ss. 341, 362, 386 and 392 of the Canadian Criminal Code. (These sections are set out in an appendix.) The visa officer Susan Dragan nonetheless indicated the reasons for her decision at paragraph 24 of her affidavit in reply to the instant application:
| 24. Given the Applicant's admitted registration of a false divorce to obtain financial gain and his declared intended re-registration of marriage to obtain admission to Canada for his (ex)spouse in verbal statements sworn at interview, the written record of the former actions as stated above (registration of a false divorce in order to obtain financial gain) indicated in the consultant's letter of April 17, 1998 recorded in the Family Census Register and Resident Register dated June 16, 1998, the glaring omissions and unexplained additions in the translations of the aforementioned registers, the significant omissions or discrepancies of their explanations/actions in the solemn affirmations of the Applicant and consultant company employee respectively, it was my conclusion that there was reasonable grounds to believe that the Applicant had committed an offence. |
[11] I note that the plaintiff did not establish the absence of any correlation between the acts alleged against him and ss. 228 and 347 of the Korean criminal code; nor did the plaintiff argue that there was no equivalence between the Canadian statutes and the Korean one, or how all or some of the sections of the Canadian Criminal Code did not cover the facts in the case at bar.
[12] I consider that in light of the evidence it was not unreasonable for the visa officer to conclude that the plaintiff fell into an inadmissible class of immigrants inasmuch as, by the plaintiff's own admission, he had committed acts designed to enable his wife to obtain a financial benefit.
[13] For these reasons, the application for judicial review must be dismissed.
[14] Counsel for the plaintiff suggested that the following question be certified by the Court pursuant to s. 83 of the Immigration Act for purposes of an appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal:
| [TRANSLATION] |
| Did the visa officer wrongly conclude, based only on the plaintiff's comments made to the visa officer about the reasons which led him to obtain a divorce and without reference to the Korean law on divorce, the divorce decree, the state of the criminal law on the matter or any other material evidence, that she had reasonable grounds to believe that the plaintiff had committed acts or omissions abroad which would constitute an offence in Korea within the meaning of s. 19(1)(c.1)(ii) of the Immigration Act, R.S.C. (1985) c. I-2? |
[15] I do not feel that there is any basis for certifying this question. First, the visa application was not denied on the basis of s. 19(c.1)(ii), but s. 19(a.1)(ii) of the Act. Further, not only does this question not transcend the immediate interest of the parties5 but it could not enable the Court of Appeal to dispose of the matter6 inasmuch as the record contains no reference to the Korean law on divorce or even the divorce decree which the Court could consider.
| PIERRE DENAULT Judge |
Ottawa, Ontario
May 8, 2000
Certified true translation
Martine Brunet, LL. B.
APPENDIX
to the reasons for order of Denault J.
dated May 8, 2000
in case IMM-975-99
Korean Criminal Code
228. (Untrue Entry in an Officially Authenticated Original Deed)
(1) A person who makes a false statement to a public official, thereby causing an untrue entry to be made in the original of an authenticated deed, shall be punished by penal servitude for not more than five years or by a fine not exceeding twenty-five thousand Hwan.
(2) A person who makes an untrue statement to a public official, thereby causing a false entry to be made in a license, permit or passport, shall be punished by penal servitude for not more than five years or by a fine not exceeding twenty-five thousand Hwan.
347. (Fraud)
(1) A person who defrauds another, thereby taking such person's property or obtaining pecuniary advantage from the latter, shall be punished by penal servitude for not more than ten years or by a fine not exceeding fifty thousand Hwan.
(2) The preceding paragraph shall apply to a person who, by the methods of the preceding paragraph, causes a third person to take such person's property or to obtain pecuniary advantage from the latter.
Canadian Criminal Code
| Fait de cacher frauduleusement 341. Est coupable d'un acte criminel et passible d'un emprisonnement maximal de deux ans quiconque, à des fins frauduleuses, prend, obtient, enlève ou cache quoi que ce soit. |
Fraudulent concealment 341. Every one who, for a fraudulent purpose, takes, obtains, removes or conceals anything is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years. |
| Escroquerie : faux semblant ou fausse déclaration 362. (1) Commet une infraction quiconque, selon le cas : a) par un faux semblant, soit directement, soit par l'intermédiaire d'un contrat obtenu par un faux semblant, obtient une chose à l'égard de laquelle l'infraction de vol peut être commise ou la fait livrer à une autre personne; b) obtient du crédit par un faux semblant ou par fraude; c) sciemment fait ou fait faire, directement ou indirectement, une fausse déclaration par écrit avec l'intention qu'on y ajoute foi, en ce qui regarde sa situation financière ou ses moyens ou sa capacité de payer, ou la situation financière, les moyens ou la capacité de payer de toute personne, maison de commerce ou personne morale dans laquelle il est intéressé ou pour laquelle il agit, en vue d'obtenir, sous quelque forme que ce soit, à son avantage ou pour le bénéfice de cette personne, maison ou personne morale : (i) soit la livraison de biens meubles, (ii) soit le paiement d'une somme d'argent, (iii) soit l'octroi d'un prêt, (iv) soit l'ouverture ou l'extension d'un crédit, (v) soit l'escompte d'une valeur à recevoir, (vi) soit la création, l'acceptation, l'escompte ou l'endossement d'une lettre de change, d'un chèque, d'une traite ou d'un billet à ordre; d) sachant qu'une fausse déclaration par écrit a été faite concernant sa situation financière, ou ses moyens ou sa capacité de payer, ou la situation financière, les moyens ou la capacité de payer d'une autre personne, maison de commerce ou personne morale dans laquelle il est intéressé ou pour laquelle il agit, obtient sur la foi de cette déclaration, à son avantage ou pour le bénéfice de cette personne, maison ou personne morale, une chose mentionnée aux sous-alinéas c)(i) à (vi). Peine (2) Quiconque commet une infraction visée à l'alinéa (1)a) : a) est coupable d'un acte criminel et passible d'un emprisonnement maximal de dix ans, si le bien obtenu est un titre testamentaire ou si la valeur de ce qui est obtenu dépasse cinq mille dollars; b) est coupable : (i) soit d'un acte criminel et passible d'un emprisonnement maximal de deux ans, (ii) soit d'une infraction punissable sur déclaration de culpabilité par procédure sommaire, si la valeur de ce qui est obtenu ne dépasse pas cinq mille dollars. Idem (3) Est coupable d'un acte criminel et passible d'un emprisonnement maximal de dix ans quiconque commet une infraction visée à l'alinéa (1)b), c) ou d). Présomption découlant d'un chèque sans provision (4) Lorsque, dans des poursuites engagées en vertu de l'alinéa (1)a), il est démontré que le prévenu a obtenu une chose au moyen d'un chèque qui, sur présentation au paiement dans un délai raisonnable, a subi un refus de paiement pour le motif qu'il n'y avait pas de provision ou de provision suffisante en dépôt au crédit du prévenu à la banque ou autre institution sur laquelle le chèque a été tiré, il est présumé que la chose a été obtenue par un faux semblant, sauf si la preuve établit, à la satisfaction du tribunal, que lorsque le prévenu a émis le chèque il avait des motifs raisonnables de croire que ce chèque serait honoré lors de la présentation au paiement dans un délai raisonnable après son émission. Définition de "chèque" (5) Au présent article, est assimilée à un chèque une lettre de change tirée sur toute institution où il est de pratique commerciale d'honorer les lettres de change de tout genre, tirées sur elle par ses déposants. |
| False pretence or false statement 362. (1) Every one commits an offence who (a) by a false pretence, whether directly or through the medium of a contract obtained by a false pretence, obtains anything in respect of which the offence of theft may be committed or causes it to be delivered to another person; (b) obtains credit by a false pretence or by fraud; (c) knowingly makes or causes to be made, directly or indirectly, a false statement in writing with intent that it should be relied on, with respect to the financial condition or means or ability to pay of himself or any person, firm or corporation that he is interested in or that he acts for, for the purpose of procuring, in any form whatever, whether for his benefit or the benefit of that person, firm or corporation, (i) the delivery of personal property, (ii) the payment of money, (iii) the making of a loan, (iv) the grant or extension of credit, (v) the discount of an account receivable, or (vi) the making, accepting, discounting or endorsing of a bill of exchange, cheque, draft or promissory note; or (d) knowing that a false statement in writing has been made with respect to the financial condition or means or ability to pay of himself or another person, firm or corporation that he is interested in or that he acts for, procures on the faith of that statement, whether for his benefit or for the benefit of that person, firm or corporation, anything mentioned in subparagraphs (c)(i) to (vi). Punishment (2) Every one who commits an offence under paragraph (1)(a) |
| (a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding ten years, where the property obtained is a testamentary instrument or the value of what is obtained exceeds five thousand dollars; or (b) is guilty (i) of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or (ii) of an offence punishable on summary conviction, where the value of what is obtained does not exceed five thousand dollars. Idem (3) Every one who commits an offence under paragraph (1)(b), (c) or (d) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years. Presumption from cheque issued without funds (4) Where, in proceedings under paragraph (1)(a), it is shown that anything was obtained by the accused by means of a cheque that, when presented for payment within a reasonable time, was dishonoured on the ground that no funds or insufficient funds were on deposit to the credit of the accused in the bank or other institution on which the cheque was drawn, it shall be presumed to have been obtained by a false pretence, unless the court is satisfied by evidence that when the accused issued the cheque he believed on reasonable grounds that it would be honoured if presented for payment within a reasonable time after it was issued. Definition of "cheque" (5) In this section, "cheque" includes, in addition to its ordinary meaning, a bill of exchange drawn on any institution that makes it a business practice to honour bills of exchange or any particular kind thereof drawn on it by depositors. |
| Enregistrement frauduleux de titre 386. Est coupable d'un acte criminel et passible d'un emprisonnement maximal de cinq ans quiconque, en qualité de commettant ou d'agent, dans une procédure pour enregistrer le titre d'un bien immeuble ou dans une opération relative à un bien immeuble qui est enregistré ou dont l'enregistrement est projeté, sciemment et avec l'intention de tromper, selon le cas : a) fait une fausse énonciation ou représentation essentielle; b) supprime, ou cache à un juge ou registrateur ou à un employé ou assistant du registrateur, tout document, fait, matière ou renseignement essentiel; c) contribue à faire une chose mentionnée à l'alinéa a) ou b). |
Fraudulent registration of title 386. Every one who, as principal or agent, in a proceeding to register title to real property, or in a transaction relating to real property that is or is proposed to be registered, knowingly and with intent to deceive, (a) makes a material false statement or representation, (b) suppresses or conceals from a judge or registrar, or any person employed by or assisting the registrar, any material document, fact, matter or information, or (c) is privy to anything mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years. |
| Aliénation de biens avec l'intention de frauder des créanciers 392. Est coupable d'un acte criminel et passible d'un emprisonnement maximal de deux ans quiconque, selon le cas : a) avec l'intention de frauder ses créanciers : (i) soit fait ou fait faire quelque don, transport, cession, vente, transfert ou remise de ses biens, (ii) soit enlève ou cache un de ses biens, ou s'en défait; b) dans le dessein qu'une personne quelconque fraude ses créanciers, reçoit un bien au moyen ou à l'égard duquel une infraction a été commise aux termes de l'alinéa a). |
| Disposal of property to defraud creditors 392. Every one who, (a) with intent to defraud his creditors, (i) makes or causes to be made any gift, conveyance, assignment, sale, transfer or delivery of his property, or (ii) removes, conceals or disposes of any of his property, or (b) with intent that any one should defraud his creditors, receives any property by means of or in relation to which an offence has been committed under paragraph (a), is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years. |
FEDERAL COURT OF CANADA
TRIAL DIVISION
NAMES OF COUNSEL AND SOLICITORS OF RECORD
| COURT No.: IMM-975-99 |
| STYLE OF CAUSE: CHOI, Min Su v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration |
| PLACE OF HEARING: Montréal, Quebec |
| DATE OF HEARING: May 2, 2000 |
| REASONS FOR ORDER BY: DENAULT J. |
| DATED: May 8, 2000 |
APPEARANCES:
| Daniel Paquin for the plaintiff |
| Lisa Maziade for the defendant |
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
| Daniel Paquin for the plaintiff |
Montréal, Quebec
| Morris Rosenberg for the defendant |
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
__________________1 Certain information, including dates in the original document, did not appear in the FCR translation; further, a list of 6 individuals including the ex-wife appeared in the RR translation, whereas the ex-wife was absent from the original document, which contained a list of only five individuals.
2 See paragraphs 18 to 23 of the affidavit of the visa officer Susan Dragan.
3 [1996] F.C.J. No. 1060, case No. A-329-95 (F.C.A.), para. 25.
4 [1998] 2 F.C. 642, para. 27.
5 Liyanagamage v. M.C.I. (1994), 176 N.R. 4, A-703-93, Nov. 1, 1997 (F.C.A.).
6 Samoylenko et al. v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1996), 116 F.T.R. 144.