Ottawa, Ontario, this 26th day of January, 2004
Present: The Honourable Mr. Justice Mosley
BETWEEN:
EDUCATIONAL TESTING SERVICE
Plaintiff
and
MAPLE LEAF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING, INC.
AND SUNDARAM "SONNY" PITCHUMANI
Defendants
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1] The defendant, Sundaram Pitchumani, has brought two motions in writing, each appealing an order of a prothonotary. The first motion, filed with the Court on November 14, 2003 seeks to appeal an Order of Prothonotary Milczynski, dated November 4, 2003, which granted the plaintiff, Educational Testing Service ("ETS"), an extension of time to serve and file its reply representations to the defendant's response to the plaintiff's previous motion pursuant to Rule 97 of the Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106 (provisions described in the attached Annex).
[2] The second motion, filed with the Court on December 1, 2003, seeks to appeal an Order of Prothonotary Lafrenière dated November 21, 2003 and requests the following relief:
1. Appealing and seeking the annulment of Prothonotary's order of November 21, 2003 pursuant to Rule 51 of the Federal Court.
2. An order seeking a finding of perjury (willful intent to mislead the court through perjured statements) committed by Mr. Rohit Parekh in his affidavit sworn October 1, 2003 in support of Rule 97 motion of the Plaintiff, and a finding of misconduct under Rule 404 on the part of the attorneys for the plaintiff...
3. Costs of this motion payable to the defendant under Rule 401(1), and reparations payable to the defendant in the amount of $100,000 under Rule 404 by the Plaintiff's attorneys...
[3] This matter concerns an action brought against Mr. Pitchumani and the corporate defendant, Maple Leaf International Consulting, Inc. ("Maple Leaf"), in March 2001 alleging infringement and depreciation of the goodwill attaching to the trademarks of the plaintiff, ETS. The action against Maple Leaf was largely concluded by the Order of Mr. Justice Lemieux dated May 15th, 2001 which, inter alia, gave default judgment against the corporation upon conditions being satisfied. That occurring, default judgment was entered by Mr. Justice O'Keefe on February 5th, 2003 against Maple Leaf. Mr. Pitchumani continued to defend the action against himself as an unrepresented litigant.
[4] In August of 2001, Mr. Pitchumani filed a motion for summary judgment in respect of the plaintiff's claim. His affidavit, sworn August 23rd, 2001, was filed in support of that motion.
[5] Early in 2003, following a status review of the action, the plaintiff took steps to cross-examine Mr. Pitchumani on his August 2001 affidavit and two subsequent affidavits that were submitted in support of his motion, sworn on March 27, 2003 and April 30, 2003 respectively. The Plaintiff served and filed its own motion for summary judgment against Mr. Pitchumani on March 14, 2003 together with a Direction to attend for cross-examination. There followed what appears to have been a concerted effort by Mr. Pitchumani to resist cross-examination on these affidavits, notwithstanding repeated directions from the Court to make himself available for those purposes.
[6] On October 1, 2003, the plaintiff brought a motion pursuant to Rules 97 and 369 of the Federal Court Rules, 1998, for an order striking, or, in the alternative dismissing, the defendant's summary judgment motion and striking his evidence filed in support, together with costs for the motion and for those costs"thrown away" by the defendant's failure to attend the cross-examinations.
[7] On November 4, 2003, Prothonotary Milczynski issued an order granting ETS an extension of time to file its reply record, as part of its motion pursuant to Rule 97. This Order was made pursuant to Rule 369, on the basis of written submissions, and stated that upon reading the motion record and written representations of both ETS and Mr. Pitchumani, that the time provided in Rules 203(2) and 369(3) was to be extended by two days from the date of the Order.
[8] On November 21st, 2003, Prothonotary Roger Lafrenière, the case management prothonotary in this action, issued an Order dismissing the defendant's summary judgment motion, the affidavit evidence submitted in support of that motion by the defendant and the affidavit filed in support of the defendant's response to the plaintiff's summary judgment motion and awarded costs to the plaintiff, both for the motion and for the costs thrown away for the defendant's failure to attend for cross-examination. Additionally, the defendant was prohibited from taking any further steps in these proceedings except an appeal from the prothonotary's Order, pending payment of all outstanding costs owed to the plaintiff. Included in the outstanding costs was an award of $750 ordered payable forthwith by Associate Senior Prothonotary Giles on September 10, 2001 "before any further step is taken save for an appeal" of his order. Over two years later, that order remained unsatisfied.
[9] Prothonotary Lafrenière's Order of November 21, 2003 describes Mr. Pitchumani's conduct in the proceedings as being "obstructive, reprehensible and outrageous" and thus deserving of sanction by the Court. Further, the Order stated that Mr. Pichumani had "demonstrated disdain and a complete disregard for the Orders of this Court". I would agree with those conclusions based on a reading of the record and in particular the materials submitted by Mr. Pitchumani in support of his summary judgment motion. They are replete with scurrilous allegations against plaintiff's counsel and the case management prothonotary and reveal a near contemptuous attitude toward the Court and its procedures.
[10] The materials submitted to the Court in support of both appeals are in a similar vein and, for the most part, are not worthy of consideration in so far as they consist of ad hominen attacks and baseless allegations.
[11] The Federal Court of Appeal has recently addressed the standard of review to be applied upon appeal of a decision of a prothonotary. In Merck & Co. v. Apotex Inc., 2003 FCA 488, Décary J.A., clarified the standard of review set out in Canada v. Aqua-Gem Investments Ltd., [1993] 2 F.C. 425 (C.A.), at paragraph 19, as follows:
... I think it is appropriate to slightly reformulate the test for the standard of review. I will use the occasion to reverse the sequence of the propositions as originally set out, for the practical reason that a judge should logically determine first whether the questions are vital to the final issue: it is only when they are not that the judge effectively needs to engage in the process of determining whether the orders are clearly wrong. The test would now read:
Discretionary orders of prothonotaries ought not be disturbed on appeal to a judge unless:
(a) the questions raised in the motion are vital to the final issue of the case, or
(b) the orders are clearly wrong, in the sense that the exercise of discretion by the prothonotary was based upon a wrong principle or upon a misapprehension of the facts.
[12] In relation to the first motion, an appeal of the November 4, 2003 Order of Prothonotary Milczynski, the defendant contends that the prothonotary erred in not providing reasons for her Order. In my view, the defendant has not demonstrated that this Order is "clearly wrong", in that the prothonotary based the exercise of her discretion on a wrong principle of law or upon a misapprehension of the facts. There is no requirement that a prothonotary provide reasons for an order, and an order without reasons will not automatically afford grounds for intervention: see Anchor Brewing Co. v. Sleeman Brewing & Malting Co. (2001), 15 C.P.R. (4th) 63 (F.C.T.D.). There is no indication that the prothonotary based her order to grant an extension of time to the plaintiffs on any erroneous principle or misapprehension of the facts. The defendant's submissions on this appeal simply reiterate his hyperbolic allegations against the plaintiff in relation to the Rule 97 motion, which, at the time of Prothonotary Milczynski's Order, continued to be outstanding before the Court.
[13] Moving now to the second motion of the defendant, where he seeks appeal of Prothonotary Lafrenière's November 21, 2003 Order, the sole issue that warrants consideration in this appeal, is whether the prothonotary exceeded his jurisdiction under Rule 50 of the Federal Court Rules, 1998, in "dismissing" the defendant's summary judgment motion. In my opinion, having regard to the dicta set out in Merck & Co, supra, in relation to whether questions raised in an appeal of a prothonotary's order are "vital" to a final issue, I find that the question related to Rule 50 does not raise a question that is vital to the final issue of the case. Therefore, the standard of review that must be applied is whether the Order is "clearly wrong", in that it was based on a wrong legal principle or based on a misapprehension of the facts.
[14] The relevant provisions of Rule 50 provides as follows:
| 50(1) A prothonotary may hear, and make any necessary orders relating to, any motion under these Rules other than a motion
... (c) for summary judgment in a proceeding other than
(i) in an action referred to in subsection (2), or
(ii) in respect of a claim referred to in subsection (3); ...
(2) A prothonotary may hear an action exclusively for monetary relief, or an action in rem claiming monetary relief, in which no amount claimed by a party exceeds $50,000 exclusive of interest and costs.
...
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50(1) Le protonotaire peut entendre toute requête présentée en vertu des présentes règles - à l'exception des requêtes suivantes - et rendre les ordonnances nécessaires s'y rapportant : [...]
c) une requête pour obtenir un jugement sommaire, sauf s'il s'agit d'un jugement sommaire: (i) dans une action viseé au paragraphe (2),
(ii) à l'égard d'une réclamation viseé au paragraphe (3); [...]
(2) Le protonotaire peut entendre toute action visant exclusivement une réparation pécuniaire ou toute action réelle visant en outre une réparation pécuniaire dans lesquelles chaque réclamation s'élève à au plus 50 000_$, à l'exclusion des intérêts et des dépens.
[...] |
[15] The applicant/defendant contends that the prothonotary's Order of November 21, 2003 must be set aside on the ground that a prothonotary does not have the "power" to hear or make a ruling in respect of a summary judgment motion. The respondent/plaintiff argues in reply that Rule 50 (1)(c) concerns the hearing of a summary judgment motion and that no argument having been heard in regard to that motion, the prothonotary made an appropriate order to strike the motion and the several affidavits under Rule 97. Rule 97 provides for the dismissal of proceedings or judgment by default, as the case may be, for failure to attend an oral examination or other misconduct.
[16] A prothonotary clearly has jurisdiction to issue orders pursuant to Rule 97. The October 1, 2003 motion of the plaintiff was brought under this Rule, due to the defendant's alleged failure to attend at cross-examination and other misconduct. The prothonotary analysed the evidence and written argument before him and "dismissed" the proceeding under his broad power pursuant to Rule 97 (d). He also struck the defendant's affidavits, pursuant to Rule 97 (c). Both these orders were within his jurisdiction.
[17] There is no basis for finding that the Order of the prothontary, dated November 21, 2003 is "clearly wrong". I agree with the plaintiff's position that Rule 50(1)(c) is directed at limiting a prothonotary's jurisdiction "to hear" and then make "any necessary orders" related thereto, certain categories of summary judgement motions, on their merits. Such a situation did not arise in this case. The language used in the November 21, 2003 Order, "dismissing" the defendant's summary judgment motion, refers to the dismissal of the proceeding for misconduct, pursuant to Rule 97(d), and not pursuant to Rules 213-219, which govern summary judgment motions.
[18] In its response to the defendant's appeal, the plaintiff seeks an order striking the defendant's affidavit, sworn November 28, 2003 and filed on his motion to appeal the prothonotary's November 21, 2003 Order, on the basis that the applicant must have leave of the Court to file such evidence on appeal, as no new evidence may be submitted on an appeal of a prothonotary's decision. In this regard, I refer to James River Corp. of Virginia v. Hallmark Cards Inc. (1997), 126 F.T.R. 1. The plaintiff requests that pursuant to Rule 74, the Court order that this document be removed from the Court file, as being improperly filed. While I agree with the plaintiff 's submission that the affidavit is improper, in that fresh affidavit evidence is generally not considered on Rule 51 motions, I decline to exercise my discretion to order its removal as the affidavit, on the whole, merely repeats the baseless accusations made by Mr. Pitchumani in the material he filed before Prothonotary Lafrenière, dated October 8, 2003 and November 5, 2003, and as such does not contain new evidence.
[19] Costs in these appeals shall be payable by the individual defendant in favour of the plaintiff, payable to the plaintiff in any event of the cause.
ORDERS
THIS COURT ORDERS that:
1. The defendant's motion, filed November 14, 2003, appealing Prothonotary Milczynski's November 4, 2003 Order is dismissed;
2. The defendant's motion, filed December 1, 2003, appealing Prothonotary Lafrenière's November 21, 2003 Order is dismissed;
3. Costs for each motion, brought by the defendant and filed on November 18, 2003 and December 1, 2003 respectively, shall be payable by the individual defendant to plaintiff, in any event of the cause.
"Richard G. Mosley"
J.F.C.
Annex
| Federal Court Rules, 1998, SOR/98-106
Removal of documents improperly filed
74. (1) Subject to subsection (2), the Court may, at any time, order that a document that is not filed in accordance with these Rules or pursuant to an order of the Court or an Act of Parliament be removed from the Court file.
Failure to attend or misconduct 97. Where a person fails to attend an oral examination or refuses to take an oath, answer a proper question, produce a document or other material required to be produced or comply with an order made under rule 96, the Court may (a) order the person to attend or re-attend, as the case may be, at his or her own expense; (b) order the person to answer a question that was improperly objected to and any proper question arising from the answer; (c) strike all or part of the person's evidence, including an affidavit made by the person; (d) dismiss the proceeding or give judgment by default, as the case may be; or (e) order the person or the party on whose behalf the person is being examined to pay the costs of the examination.
Statement of claim 203.(2) Proof of service of a statement of claim shall be filed within the time set out in rule 204 for the service and filing of a statement of defence.
Where available to plaintiff 213. (1) A plaintiff may, after the defendant has filed a defence, or earlier with leave of the Court, and at any time before the time and place for trial are fixed, bring a motion for summary judgment on all or part of the claim set out in the statement of claim.
Where available to defendant (2) A defendant may, after serving and filing a defence and at any time before the time and place for trial are fixed, bring a motion for summary judgment dismissing all or part of the claim set out in the statement of claim.
Obligations of moving party 214. (1) A party may bring a motion for summary judgment in an action by serving and filing a notice of motion and motion record at least 20 days before the day set out in the notice for the hearing of the motion.
Obligations of responding party (2) A party served with a motion for summary judgment shall serve and file a respondent's motion record not later than 10 days before the day set out in the notice of motion for the hearing of the motion.
Mere denial 215. A response to a motion for summary judgment shall not rest merely on allegations or denials of the pleadings of the moving party, but must set out specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Where no genuine issue for trial 216. (1) Where on a motion for summary judgment the Court is satisfied that there is no genuine issue for trial with respect to a claim or defence, the Court shall grant summary judgment accordingly.
Genuine issue of amount or question of law (2) Where on a motion for summary judgment the Court is satisfied that the only genuine issue is (a) the amount to which the moving party is entitled, the Court may order a trial of that issue or grant summary judgment with a reference under rule 153 to determine the amount; or (b) a question of law, the Court may determine the question and grant summary judgment accordingly.
(3) Where on a motion for summary judgment the Court decides that there is a genuine issue with respect to a claim or defence, the Court may nevertheless grant summary judgment in favour of any party, either on an issue or generally, if the Court is able on the whole of the evidence to find the facts necessary to decide the questions of fact and law.
Where motion dismissed 216.(4) Where a motion for summary judgment is dismissed in whole or in part, the Court may order the action, or the issues in the action not disposed of by summary judgment, to proceed to trial in the usual way or order that the action be conducted as a specially managed proceeding.
Effect of summary judgment 217. A plaintiff who obtains summary judgment under these Rules may proceed against the same defendant for any other relief and against any other defendant for the same or any other relief.
Powers of Court 218. Where summary judgment is refused or is granted only in part, the Court may make an order specifying which material facts are not in dispute and defining the issues to be tried, including an order (a) for payment into court of all or part of the claim; (b) for security for costs; or (c) limiting the nature and scope of the examination for discovery to matters not covered by the affidavits filed on the motion for summary judgment or by any cross-examination on them and providing for their use at trial in the same manner as an examination for discovery.
Stay of execution 219. In making an order for summary judgment, the Court may order that enforcement of the summary judgment be stayed pending the determination of any other issue in the action or in a counterclaim or third party claim.
Motions in writing 369. (1) A party may, in a notice of motion, request that the motion be decided on the basis of written representations.
...
Reply (3) A moving party may serve and file written representations in reply within four days after being served with a respondent's record under subsection (2). |
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Règles de la Cour fédérale, 1998, DORS/98-106
Retrait de documents irrégulièrement déposés 74. (1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (2), la Cour peut à tout moment ordonner que soient retirés du dossier de la Cour les documents qui n'ont pas été déposés en conformité avec les présentes règles, une ordonnance de la Cour ou une loi fédérale.
Défaut de comparaître ou inconduite 97. Si une personne ne se présente pas à un interrogatoire oral ou si elle refuse de prêter serment, de répondre à une question légitime, de produire un document ou un élément matériel demandés ou de se conformer à une ordonnance rendue en application de la règle 96, la Cour peut : a) ordonner à cette personne de subir l'interrogatoire ou un nouvel interrogatoire oral, selon le cas, à ses frais; b) ordonner à cette personne de répondre à toute question à l'égard de laquelle une objection a été jugée injustifiée ainsi qu'à toute question légitime découlant de sa réponse; c) ordonner la radiation de tout ou partie de la preuve de cette personne, y compris ses affidavits; d) ordonner que l'instance soit rejetée ou rendre jugement par défaut, selon le cas; e) ordonner que la personne ou la partie au nom de laquelle la personne est interrogée paie les frais de l'interrogatoire oral.
Déclaration 203.(2) La preuve de la signification de la déclaration est déposée dans le délai prévu à la règle 204, pour la signification et le dépôt de la défense.
Requête du demandeur 213. (1) Le demandeur peut, après le dépôt de la défense du défendeur - ou avant si la Cour l'autorise - et avant que l'heure, la date et le lieu de l'instruction soient fixés, présenter une requête pour obtenir un jugement sommaire sur tout ou partie de la réclamation contenue dans la déclaration.
Requête du défendeur (2) Le défendeur peut, après avoir signifié et déposé sa défense et avant que l'heure, la date et le lieu de l'instruction soient fixés, présenter une requête pour obtenir un jugement sommaire rejetant tout ou partie de la réclamation contenue dans la déclaration
Obligations du requérant 214. (1) Toute partie peut présenter une requête pour obtenir un jugement sommaire dans une action en signifiant et en déposant un avis de requête et un dossier de requête au moins 20 jours avant la date de l'audition de la requête indiquée dans l'avis.
Obligations de l'autre partie (2) La partie qui reçoit signification d'une requête en jugement sommaire signifie et dépose un dossier de réponse au moins 10 jours avant la date de l'audition de la requête indiquée dans l'avis de requête.
Réponse suffisante 215. La réponse à une requête en jugement sommaire ne peut être fondée uniquement sur les allégations ou les dénégations contenues dans les actes de procédure déposés par le requérant. Elle doit plutôt énoncer les faits précis démontrant l'existence d'une véritable question litigieuse.
Absence de véritable question litigieuse 216. (1) Lorsque, par suite d'une requête en jugement sommaire, la Cour est convaincue qu'il n'existe pas de véritable question litigieuse quant à une déclaration ou à une défense, elle rend un jugement sommaire en conséquence.
Somme d'argent ou point de droit (2) Lorsque, par suite d'une requête en jugement sommaire, la Cour est convaincue que la seule véritable question litigieuse est : a) le montant auquel le requérant a droit, elle peut ordonner l'instruction de la question ou rendre un jugement sommaire assorti d'un renvoi pour détermination du montant conformément à la règle 153; b) un point de droit, elle peut statuer sur celui-ci et rendre un jugement sommaire en conséquence. (3) Lorsque, par suite d'une requête en jugement sommaire, la Cour conclut qu'il existe une véritable question litigieuse à l'égard d'une déclaration ou d'une défense, elle peut néanmoins rendre un jugement sommaire en faveur d'une partie, soit sur une question particulière, soit de façon générale, si elle parvient à partir de l'ensemble de la preuve à dégager les faits nécessaires pour trancher les questions de fait et de droit.
Rejet de la requête 216(4) Lorsque la requête en jugement sommaire est rejetée en tout ou en partie, la Cour peut ordonner que l'action ou les questions litigieuses qui ne sont pas tranchées par le jugement sommaire soient instruites de la manière habituelle ou elle peut ordonner la tenue d'une instance à gestion spéciale.
Effet du jugement sommaire 217. Le demandeur qui obtient un jugement sommaire aux termes des présentes règles peut poursuivre le même défendeur pour une autre réparation ou poursuivre tout autre défendeur pour la même ou une autre réparation.
Pouvoirs de la Cour 218. Lorsqu'un jugement sommaire est refusé ou n'est accordé qu'en partie, la Cour peut, par ordonnance, préciser les faits substantiels qui ne sont pas en litige et déterminer les questions qui doivent être instruites, ainsi que : a) ordonner la consignation à la Cour d'une somme d'argent représentant la totalité ou une partie de la réclamation; b) ordonner la remise d'un cautionnement pour dépens; c) limiter la nature et l'étendue de l'interrogatoire préalable aux questions non visées par les affidavits déposés à l'appui de la requête en jugement sommaire, ou limiter la nature et l'étendue de tout contre-interrogatoire s'y rapportant, et permettre l'utilisation de ces affidavits lors de l'interrogatoire à l'instruction de la même manière qu'à l'interrogatoire préalable
Sursis d'exécution 219. Lorsqu'elle rend un jugement sommaire, la Cour peut surseoir à l'exécution forcée de ce jugement jusqu'à la détermination d'une autre question soulevée dans l'action ou dans une demande reconventionnelle ou une mise en cause.
Procédure de requête écrite 369. (1) Le requérant peut, dans l'avis de requête, demander que la décision à l'égard de la requête soit prise uniquement sur la base de ses prétentions écrites.
[...]
Réponse du requérant (3) Le requérant peut signifier et déposer des prétentions écrites en réponse au dossier de réponse dans les quatre jours après en avoir reçu signification.
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FEDERAL COURT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: T-550-01
STYLE OF CAUSE: EDUCATIONAL TESTING SERVICE v.MAPLE LEAF INTERNATIONAL CONSULTING, INC. AND SUNDARAM "SONNY" PITCHUMANI
MOTION DEALT WITH IN WRITING WITHOUT APPEARANCE OF PARTIES
REASONS FOR ORDER
AND ORDER BY: The Honourable Mr. Justice Mosley
DATED: January 26, 2004
WRITTEN REPRESENTATIONS BY:
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A. Kelly Gill |
FOR THE PLAINTIFF |
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FOR THE DEFENDANTS |
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
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Toronto, Ontario |
FOR THE PLAINTIFF |
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Toronto, Ontario |
FOR THE DEFENDANTS |