Federal Court Decisions

     IMM-1773-96

BETWEEN:

     VLADIMIR GRINEVICH

     ILANA GRINEVICH

     YULIA GRINEVICH

     PAVEL GRINEVICH,

     Applicants,

     - and -

     THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND

     IMMIGRATION,

     Respondent.

     REASONS FOR ORDER

PINARD J:

     This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Convention Refugee Determination Division ("the Board") dated May 7, 1996, whereby the applicants were determined not to be refugees within the meaning of the Convention.

     The applicants were all originally citizens of Russia. Vladimir Grinevich, the principal applicant, was born on March 7, 1957, in Severomorsk, Russia (formerly part of the U.S.S.R) to a Polish father and a Russian mother. His wife Ilana was born in Riga, Latvia (formerly part of the U.S.S.R.), to a Russian father and a Jewish mother. Their minor daughter, Yulia Grinevich, was born on July 4, 1978, and their minor son, Pavel Grinevich, was born on May 26, 1983. They arrived in Canada from Israel on December 17, 1992, and immediately indicated their intention to claim refugee status.

     At page 2 of the decision, the Board provides a helpful summary of the alleged facts leading to the applicants' fear of persecution. The relevant extract reads as follows:

...In the narrative part of his PIF, the principal claimant alleges that his family had been persecuted by the KGB in his native country. Furthermore, because his wife (the female claimant) is of mixed lineage with a Russian father and Jewish mother, they were also the object of anti-Semitism. Because of threats from communists, the KGB and anti-Semitic groups, they decided to leave their country. They were able to obtain an invitation to Israel and given the female claimant's Jewish background, they applied to the Israeli Consulate for a visa which was granted under the Law of Return. They renounced their Russian citizenship.

According to their story, although they were pleased to be able to leave Russia, they did not intend to go to Israel. Their intention was to travel to a country other than Israel once they reached Budapest in Hungary.

They arrived in Budapest by train on 1 October, 1990. In Budapest they were unable to change their destination and proceeded by air to Israel. Upon their arrival in Israel they were shocked to learn that they had been granted Israeli citizenship under the Law of Return. According to the principal claimant they were "shanghaied" to Israel and were "Israeli hostages".

The female claimant and the minor claimants adopted the narrative of the principal claimant. The claimants regard themselves as stateless and make their claims against Russia as the country of former habitual residence. Subsequently, during the course of the proceedings, the claimants made a claim with respect to Israel as a consequence of the panel's finding that the claimants are citizens of that country.

     In essence, the Board's decision turns on its finding that the applicants were not credible with respect to their alleged fear of persecution in Israel. Upon reviewing the evidence, it is my opinion that this was a finding which was reasonable and supported by the evidence. Contrary to the assertions of the applicants, the Board provided numerous reasons for not finding their testimony credible. For instance, the Tribunal noted the failure of the principal applicant to mention in the narrative portion of his PIF (relied on by all of the applicants) any of the events which the applicants later described in oral testimony, such as problems with employment, accommodation, harassment of the minor claimants at school, and their objection to compulsory military service. Where a refugee claimant fails to mention important facts in his or her PIF, this may legitimately be considered by the Board to be an omission that goes to lack of credibility. In my view, the Tribunal was entitled to disbelieve the applicants' contention that they did not mention these events as they thought their claim was going to be assessed against Russia.

     In addition to noting the unsatisfactorily explained contradiction between the PIF and the applicants' oral testimony, the Tribunal noted the demeanour, lack of spontaneity and uncooperative behaviour of the applicants as factors contributing to its assessment that their account of the events they suffered in Israel lack credibility. It is well established that the Board is entitled to draw negative credibility inferences from such factors, and that unless the credibility finding is unreasonable, this Court ought not to interfere.

     The Tribunal's perception that the applicants are not credible effectively amounts to a finding that there is no credible evidence on which it could allow their claim for refugee status. In Sheikh v. Canada (1990), 11 Imm.L.R. (2d) 81, at p. 86, Mr. Justice MacGuigan, for the Federal Court of Appeal, stated:

The concept of "credible evidence" is not, of course, the same as that of the credibility of the applicant, but it is obvious that where the only evidence before a tribunal linking the applicant to his claim is that of the applicant himself (in addition, perhaps, to "country reports" from which nothing about the applicant's claim can be directly deduced), a tribunal's perception that he is not a credible witness effectively amounts to a finding that there is no credible evidence on which the second-level tribunal could allow his claim.

     Since this is a sufficient basis on which to dismiss this application for judicial review I find it unnecessary to address the Tribunal's alternative finding that, if believed, the incidents described by the applicants would not constitute persecution.

     I agree with counsel for the parties that this is not a matter for certification.

O T T A W A

April 11, 1997

    

     Judge