Federal Court Decisions

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Date: 19981008


Docket: IMM-3158-97

BETWEEN:

     SUREASH RATNASINGAM

     Applicant

     - and -

     THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

     Respondent

     REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER

BLAIS, J.:

[1]          This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration and Refugee Board which found that the applicant was not a Convention refugee.

[2]          The applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka who arrived in Canada and claimed Convention refugee status by reason of fear of persecution based on being a Sri Lankan Tamil.

[3]          The applicant's counsel argued that the Immigration and Refugee Board (the "Board") has erred in that it made findings which misconstrued or ignored evidence before it and relying upon these findings, made an adverse determination as to the credibility of the applicant.

[4]          The applicant's counsel also argued that the Board has erred in failing in making a reasonable assessment of the applicant's credibility and by failing to put their adverse finding to the applicant to allow him to disabuse himself of the alleged implausibility.

[5]          The Board did not believe different portions of the applicant's evidence.

[6]          In the Board's decision, page 8 of the Board's Court Record, it is mentioned:

             After considering the totality of the evidence, the panel does not believe the claimant's story, notably his arrest and detention in August 1994. It notes that, as testified to, in November 1993 the claimant was arrested and detained but thereafter released without difficulties, presumably after he was able to satisfy the authorities' curiosity with regard to his identity. The panel finds it implausible that in August 1994, when the parliamentary elections were taking place, the claimant would have been subjected to brutal treatment during his alleged arrest. At the time of the claimant's second arrest, he was already in possession of his national identity card (NIC) dated November 9, 1993, with the following address: 155/2 Kenal Road, Colombo-6. An NIC is a primary document that established nationality and identity. Applications for NICs are made locally at the place of domicile. Thus, the address shown on the card is the permanent address of the bearer. Given this information, it does not seem plausible to this panel that the claimant would be detained for 10 days and would be made to endure brutal treatment at the hands of the Colombo police simply because parliamentary elections were taking place at the time, when he had the required document identifying him as a Colombo resident.             

[7]          The Board mentioned precisely that they had reviewed the totality of the evidence and after specified on page 5 and 6 of their decision that the Board is giving "more weight" to the documentary evidence from Amnesty International and the Canadian High Commission in Colombo. Amnesty International is quoted on page 5 of the Board's decision and noted:

     ...that most persons detained and questioned are released within 24 hours, or at least within two to three days.

[8]          The Board further noted that:

     ...the Canadian High Commission in Colombo, another body which this panel considers to be reputable, confirms Amnesty International's finding that in 1994 and 1995 an average of 95% of persons held for questioning were released within 24 hours, and NGOs confirm that this remains the norm.         

[9]          From this evidence, the Board concluded on page 6 of its decision:

     The panel does not believe that the claimant was subjected to brutal treatment during his August 1994 arrest.

[10]          The Board did not believe either that the applicant went back to the north at the time he suggested that he did as mentioned on page 6 of the Board's decision:

             It [was] unreasonable that the claimant, who had already established residence in Colombo as shown in his NIC, and who allegedly experienced hardships and misfortunes in the North where in mid-1992, he and his brother were asked several times to dig bunkers for the LTTE, would return to the North when peace talks were ongoing and security operations were at a slow pace, with the Human Rights Task Force reporting that in almost all cases, persons detained in 1994 were released within 24 hours. The panel does not believe that the claimant returned to Jaffna in 1994, as alleged.             

[11]          The Board made its decision based on the evidence it had before it.

[12]          On page 2 of the decision in Aghebor v. Minister of Employment and Immigration (A-1116-91), Décary J.A. stated:

             There is no longer any doubt that the Refugee Division, which is a specialized tribunal, has complete jurisdiction to determine the plausibility of testimony: who is in a better position than the Refugee Division to gauge the credibility of an account and to draw the necessary inferences? As long as the inferences drawn by the tribunal are not so unreasonable as to warrant our intervention, its findings are not open to judicial review.             

[13]          In the decision Shahamati v. The Minister of Employment and Immigration (A-333-92), Pratte J.A. stated:

             The Board is entitled, in assessing credibility, to rely on criteria such as rationality and common sense.             

[14]          The Refugee Division is entitled to reject uncontradicted evidence if it is not consistent with the probabilities affecting the case as a whole. Moreover, the Refugee Division is entitled to make an adverse finding of credibility based upon the implausibility of the applicant's story alone as it has been confirmed by jurisprudence.1

[15]          After reviewing the case, there has been no arguable issue of law upon which this application might succeed.

[16]          For all those reasons, this application for judicial review is dismissed.

[17]          Neither counsel suggested the certification of a serious question of general importance pursuant to section 83 of the Immigration Act. I agree. Accordingly, no question will be certified.

                         Pierre Blais

                         Judge

OTTAWA, ONTARIO

October 8, 1998

__________________

1      Alizadeh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., January 11, 1993, A-26-90).          Sheikh v. M.E.I. [1990] 3 F.C. 238, 112 N.R. 61, 71 D.L.R. (4th) 604, 11 Imm. L.R. (2d) 81 (F.C.A.).          Leung v. M.E.I. (1990), 74 D.L.R. (4th) 313, 129 N.R. 391 (F.C.A.).          Rajapakse v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., June 17, 1993, 92-A-7056) at 2.          Castro v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., August 4, 1993, T-2349-92) at 2.

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