Date: 20040628
Docket: IMM-3268-03
Citation: 2004 FC 888
IN THE MATTER OF the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 2001, as amended, S.C. 2001, c. 27;
AND IN THE MATTER OF a decision of the Convention Refugee Determination Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board regarding the claims to Convention Refugee Status of ALEYA BEGUM MIA AND TAPOSHI RABEYA MIA.
BETWEEN:
ALEYA BEGUM MIA AND
TAPOSHI RABEYA MIA
Applicants
- and -
THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER
PINARD J.:
[1] This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board (the Board) dated April 3, 2003, wherein the Board found that the applicant is not a Convention refugee or a "person in need of protection" as defined in sections 96 and 97 respectively of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27.
[2] Taposhi Rabeya Mia (the applicant) is a citizen of Bangladesh who claims to fear persecution in that country on the basis of her membership in a particular social group as a single woman. The applicant also claims to be a person in need of protection. The applicant is accompanied by her father, Muhammad Hai Mia, and her mother, Aleya Begum Mia, whose refugee claims are based on their daughter's claim. On March 11, 2003 the applicant's father passed away.
[3] The Board concluded that the applicant failed to establish that she met the requirements for Convention refugee status or a "person in need of protection" because her story was not credible. Furthermore, the Board concluded that the applicant had failed to rebut the presumption of the availability of state protection.
[4] The Board retained numerous inconsistencies and implausibilities in the applicant's claim and questioned the credibility of her claim. I find that the Board's findings are generally supported by the evidence. A review of some of these findings demonstrates that the decision was reasonable and that, having considered the applicant's explanations, the Board could retain the inconsistencies and implausibilities. First, it was reasonable for the Board to question the applicant about Zahir's political affiliation since she had stated in her Personal Information Form that he was a notorious man who was politically active. When the Board asked the applicant to explain Zahir's political affiliation, she was unable to do so in a reasonable manner in light of the documentary evidence which confirms that in Bangladesh people remain loyal to one party. In addition, the Board noted that the applicant stated that she had received the letter from her friend in August 2002 while the letter was dated October 2002. This letter contained information which contradicted the applicant's earlier testimony that the house in Chandpur had already been sold at that time. The Board also rejected the medical letter submitted to corroborate the applicant's rape. I find that the Board's assessment of these two letters was reasonable. Finally, the Board found that the applicant had moved to Dhaka primarily to pursue Master's studies rather than to flee Zahir. An evaluation of the Board's decision and the transcripts of the hearing reveals that the Board reasonably drew this conclusion in light of the evidence and the explanations provided. In this case, the Board seriously questioned the applicant's allegations pertaining to the persecution she suffered. These allegations were central to her claim because they formed the basis of her fear of persecution. In light of the legal principles enunciated in Sheikh v. Canada (M.E.I.), [1990] 3 F.C. 238 (C.A.), I find that the Board did not commit an unreasonable error in rejecting the applicant's claim due to a lack of credibility.
[5] It is important to remember that the Board found that the applicant had failed to rebut the state's ability to protect her. There is a general presumption that the state is able to provide protection to its citizens and there must be clear and convincing evidence of the state's inability to do so (Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 at 724). In this case, the applicant submits that the Board erred in concluding that she had not established the state's inability to protect her because it ignored her testimony of past personal incidents confirming that the state protection she sought never materialized. An evaluation of the Board's decision and the hearing transcripts reveals that the Board did consider the applicant's testimony of past personal incidents with the authorities. The Board noted that according to the evidence the police registered the complaints, issued a First Information Report and an arrest warrant against Zahir but that he could not be apprehended because he absconded. Since the police reports demonstrate that the applicant's complaints about Zahir were considered and pursued by the authorities, the applicant has failed to show that the authorities in Bangladesh were unable and unwilling to protect her from Zahir.
[6] For all the above reasons, the application for judicial review is dismissed.
JUDGE
OTTAWA, ONTARIO
June 28, 2004
FEDERAL COURT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD
DOCKET: IMM-3268-03
STYLE OF CAUSE: ALEYA BEGUM MIA AND TAPOSHI RABEYA MIA v. THE MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
PLACE OF HEARING: Toronto, Ontario
DATE OF HEARING: May 25, 2004
REASONS FOR ORDER BY: PINARD J.
DATED: June 28, 2004
APPEARANCES:
Mr. Ian Wong FOR THE APPLICANTS
Ms. Sally Thomas FOR THE RESPONDENT
SOLICITORS OF RECORD:
Ian R. J. Wong FOR THE APPLICANTS
Barrister and Solicitor
Toronto, Ontario
Morris Rosenberg FOR THE RESPONDENT
Deputy Attorney General of Canada
Ottawa, Ontario